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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is focused on comparing financial characteristics of securitizing banks and 
non-securitizing banks. Test results show that a bank's liquidity risk, loan portfolio quality, 
funding cost, profitability and efficiency ratios are significantly correlated with securitization 
volume whereas portfolio quality, funding cost and profitability are related to securitization 
volume. Securitization activities are concentrated in large banks in terms of assets size. But when 
combined with other characteristics, size factor lost significance in relation with securitization 
level. Capital adequacy ratios are higher for non-securitizing banks than securitizing banks. Those 
findings can help banks and regulators in understanding how operational characteristics motivate 
securitization. Bankers can understand the circumstances under which they and competitors 
benefit from securitization. Regulators can conduct better .monitoring of securitizing banks 
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I. Introduction 
Securitization 1 is the process by which homogeneous illiquid assets are pooled and 
repackaged, with security interests representing claims to the incoming cash flows and 
other economic benefits generated by the loan pool sold as securities to third-party 
investors. 
The diagram below illustrates the securitization process. 
Transaction Closing Date: Post Closing Date: 
II investors || Investors || 
• • 
IVIBS / ABS Subscription Intftrest & Principal 
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This diagram shows three main categories: Originator, Special Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV), and Investors. The originator of assets sells a portfolio of assets to an insolvency 
remote SPV. The SPV funds the acquisition of these assets by applying the subscription 
1 There are two major types of classifications by assets: asset backed securities backed by non-mortgage 
and mortgage backed securities. However, as to the wide definition, both types are backed by assets and 
thus all securities at the end of securitization process are asset backed securities. The thesis uses the wide 
definition that Asset Backed Securities (ABS) refers to both securitization issues backed by all types of 
assets, mortgage and non-mortgage. 
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proceeds received from the issue of debt instruments. Thereafter, the principal and 
interest receipts on the assets are used to make payments of interest and principal on the 
debt securities. Various liquidity and credit enhancements are put in place to ensure that 
the SPV can make timely payment of interest and ultimate repayment of principal to • 
investors. 
Securitization creates value by increasing liquidity, reducing or reallocating credit 
risk, diversifying portfolios, improving leverage ratios, or reducing the level of regulatory 
capital required. As banks are changing their function from taking traditional deposit and 
lending to originating and servicing, securitization plays an essential role for the 
disintermediation process. 
Securitization originated back in the 1970s. Since then US asset backed securities 
have experienced rapid growth and have aided in creating the largest single capital 
market in recent decades. Total volume outstanding of asset backed securities in US 
reached US$ 9 trillion in year 2004 and that of non-mortgage asset backed securities was 
US$ 1 trillion.^ 
The Basel committee, an international banking supervisory organization set up two 
2 From www.bondmarket.com 
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important accords Basel I (1988) and Basel II (2004). Basel I set out minimum capital 
requirements for banks. As for Basel II，regulators created an "Internal Ratings-Based 
Approach" in addition to the standardized approach to assess the regulatory capital 
requirements for credit risk. The Internal Rating-Based Approach also goes into great 
detail on calculating capital required for ABS. This approach aligns the treatment of 
securitization-related exposures more closely to industry practice by mapping their 
internal risk assessments to external credit ratings. The Basel II set operational 
requirements and treatment of securitization exposures related to credit and liquidity risk. 
It ensures that capital charges are more sensitive to risks of exposures in the banking 
book. 
The implementation of Basel II in 2006 requires a clear and in-depth understanding 
of banks' risk and operational characteristics and how they differ between securitizing 
and non-securitizing banks is important to regulators. 
This thesis will present an updated overview of securitization for US banks at present 
and examine financial characteristics of securitizing and non-securitizing banks. Using 
data from the last quarter of year 2004 of US banks, I will identify characteristics that 
differentiate securitizing from non-securitizing US banks. I will also quantify how they 
are related to the decision whether a bank securitizes and if it does, how much it 
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securitizes. With the test results, I will 
1. Have a close-up and comparison at financial characteristics of securitizing and 
non-securitizing banks 
2. Find out relation between financial characteristics of the banks and their 
securitization decision and volume to securitize 
3. Shed light on motives and benefits of securitization 
This thesis will start with literature review. In the third section, I will explain and 
discuss the hypotheses and test design. Section four will discuss on the data and findings. 
Section five will be the results. Last section is conclusion and insights on future research. 
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II. Literature Review 
This section will review previous research about relations between bank 
characteristics and securitization. I will focus especially on the work of Obay (2000), 
which is the most complete description in the literature to date of the differences between 
securitizing and non-securitizing banks. 
Various scholars propose motives for and benefits from bank securitization, thus 
provide a basis for constructing hypotheses in this thesis. 
Regulatory capital saving 
Obay (2000) discusses that banks below or approaching the minimum capital level 
have an incentive to “off-load’’ their balance sheet. Banks do this "off-loading" by 
repackaging their booked loans into tradable securities. This thereby results in a reduction 
in the size of their assets enabling them to meet the capital requirements. 
Regulatory capital arbitrage 
Calem and LaCour-Little (2004) demonstrate that there is incentive to securitize the 
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least risky loan as regulatory capital levels are too high for most mortgage loans. They 
find capital required for banks to match the insolvency probability of a BBB-rated 
commercial bond is generally lower than current regulatory standards. For example, they 
calculate a newly originated mortgage loan with 80% loan-to-value ratios and a prime 
borrower credit score of 700^ require very little capital to cover credit risk (no more 
than .51% in a well-diversified portfolio and .9% in a regionally concentrated portfolio) 
assuming a BBB solvency standard on an eight year horizon. However, current capital 
rules assign a 50% risk weight to most residential mortgages, thus requiring a 2% tier I 
capital ratio. The “one size fits all" approach of capital requirement particularly striking 
in Basel I thus appears to promote the use of securitization, and the process is called 
"regulatory capital arbitrage". 
For example, assume a bank with $100 of loan risk weighted at 100% and $200 of 
mortgage risk weighted at 50%. Thus risk-weighted assets on the balance sheet is 
$100*100% + $200*50% = $200. Assume the bank has exactly the minimum 8% capital 
required, i.e., $16. Now imagine the bank securitizes its mortgages and the SPV requires 
a 2% of subordinate tranche. After selling the mortgage loans, the SPV has $200 
mortgage as assets whereas $196 are of rated securities and $4 retained as unrated. The 
3 Defined by Feddie Mac, the credit score is the one selected from all usable credit scores obtained for an 
individual borrower that quantifies the credit reputation risk for that individual borrower. A 
credit score of 700 means the borrower has an acceptable credit reputation. 
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originating bank thus has $100. $4 is required to be subtracted from the $16 capital as 
credit support for the asset backed securities. As a result, $12 is left as the capital over 
assets of $100 at 100% risk weighted. This leads to a total risk-based capital ratio of 12%. 
This process results in the capital ratio rising from 8% to 12%. 
Ambrose, LaCour-Little and Sanders (2003) apply a competing risks model to 
obtain the unbiased expectation of borrowers' prepayment and default risk. Their results 
show that securitized mortgage loans experience lower ex-post defaults than those 
retained in portfolio. Since regulatory arbitrage story implies that high risk loans are 
retained while low risk loans are securitized, there should be a positive relationship 
between expected default probability and the probability of retaining the loan in portfolio. 
That is, higher risk loans as revealed by higher expected default probabilities are more 
likely to be retained in the portfolio. Thus, their finding supports the argument that capital 
requirements have an incentive to sell lower risk and retain higher risk assets in portfolio. 
Bankruptcy cost avoidance 
Bankruptcy costs are the cost related to liquidating assets, attorney fees, and filing 
fees during the bankruptcy process. An SPV is designed to be entity that never goes 
bankrupt because bankruptcy would give no advantage to senior creditors. SPVs are 
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transformation devices instead of entities with substance. With the exception of the 
securitized assets they have no assets or incomes. The SPV is a legal shell with only the 
specific assets transferred by the originator, and those assets are either beneficially held 
by the investors, or collateralize the securities of the SPV. There is nothing that is left in 
SPV for anyone to have an interest in it. In other words, nobody wants the SPV to go 
bankrupt. The bankruptcy-remote characteristic for the holder of assets makes its value 
from the point of view of its claimants independent of the bankruptcy of a related third 
party especially the asset seller. The SPV that purchases the assets with new securities 
proceeds is bankruptcy-remote from the originator, such that in the event of the 
originator's bankruptcy, the claimant of the originator would have no recourse to the 
assets sold to the SPV. 
There is another story about bankruptcy cost minimization by separation. Modigliani 
and Miller (1958) state that in a world without tax and bankruptcy cost, the value of the 
firm is not affected by a change of capital structure. Many researchers prove that with 
bankruptcy costs, capital structure matters. Leland and Skarabot (2003) design a 
"merger-separation" model to compare the values of separate and merged firms and apply 
it to securitization. They argue that securitization as a separation activity from originator 
(bank) to the SPV allows each entity to have its own appropriate capital structure. As 
assets being securitized are transferred to the bankruptcy-remote SPV, the claimant of the 
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originator would have no recourse to the securitized assets in the SPV regardless of the 
financial distress or bankruptcy of the originator. The originator has limited liability and 
its debt has recourse only to its own cash flow and assets. If the activities for the bank 
and SPV are notably different in terms of risks or default costs, their optimal leverage 
ratios may also vary significantly. 
Leland and Skarabot show that under plausible assumptions, the benefit of asset 
securitization versus keeping the assets inside the firm is a negative function of the 
volatility of the securitized assets. They model the cash flow and firm value and find the 
higher the quality of the assets securitized, the higher the benefits it brings. The originator 
ends up with lower leverage ratio and more risky assets remaining within the firm while 
the SPV has the optimal leverage ratio and lower rate on borrowing. The overall outcome 
is weighed a higher leverage. 
Through a simulation, they show separation is beneficial because it allows 
substantial differences in leverage appropriate for the separate entities, i.e., originator and 
the SPV. It predicts that asset securitization will be desirable for assets with stable cash 
flows and low default costs relative to the originator. In other words, banks choose to 
securitize better quality assets and retain poor quality assets on balance sheet. 
i 
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Saving funding costs 
Pennacchi (1988) shows that securitization allows some banks to finance loans less 
expensively than by traditional deposit or equity issue. This is because bank funds being 
received via loan sales can avoid costs associated with required reserves and required 
capital. By selling loans (securitization), banks can raise funds at the same cost as 
deposits but the funds acquired through loan sales (securitization) do not appear on the 
balance sheet of the bank. The ratio of the prices for debt and equity equals the ratio of 
the certainty-equivalent rate of return on equity versus debt. The certainty-equivalent rate 
of return of equity is higher than debt and thus the price for equity is more expensive than 
debt. Therefore, the bank will not be required to issue more relatively expensive equity in 
order to stay within its capital adequacy constraint or be required to hold 
non-interest-paying reserves against these funds. Obay also discusses that funds collected 
through securitization are free from deposit insurance and reserve requirements. He also 
states that banks experiencing shortages of funds may be forced to borrow intermediated 




Ambrose, LaCour-Little and Sanders (2004) demonstrate that securitization 
increases liquidity for originator for different modes. For the agency swap program^，the 
originator receives a liquid asset in the form of a mortgage-backed security. Under the 
cash program, the originator has cash proceeds to reinvest, either in additional mortgage 
lending or in alternative liquid instruments. 
Improving management efficiency through specialization 
Obay also states that the larger the size of the bank, the higher the level of 
sophistication of the management team to be more capable of carrying out the 
complicated process of securitization. Also securitization usually requires high set-up 
costs that could be more likely to occur in large banks because of economies of scale. 
Information asymmetry/ Resolving information asymmetries 
Casual observation of securitizations shows that banks retain loans with a high 
degree of information asymmetry and sell ones with a low degree of information 
asymmetry. Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) construct a theoretical model that shows that 
given an asymmetric information environment without government intervention, banks 
4 A method of securitization in which single family residential mortgages conforming to agency 
underwriting guidelines are swapped for mortgage-backed securities issued by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. 
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would favor securitization for the best assets and deposit funding for the worst. Assuming 
risk neutral banks and risk-averse investors, they define and compare the following two 
funding modes. Deposit funding mode is a risky debt contract that the entire bank's 
capital secured the loan whereas securitized funding mode would only require partial 
insurance coverage by the bank as a guarantee against loan default. 
As the first step, they assume a world without deposit insurance, regulation and 
asymmetric information. This means the probability of loan pay-off is common 
knowledge among borrower, originator (bank) and investor. They find deposit funding 
mode and securitized funding mode are Pareto equivalent. Because under symmetric 
information environment, the optimal risk sharing arrangement for risk averse investors 
calls for all of the bank's capital to be made available to secure the loan. Thus, in 
equilibrium the borrower will set its insurance coverage on the loan at the maximum 
permitted by the bank's capital which makes the securitized funding mode contract 
identical to the deposit funding mode contract.^ 
Next, they consider the existence of information asymmetry (which means only the 
borrower gets access to the pay-off probability). The proof is in two parts. First, they 
prove that in equilibrium borrowers with higher success probabilities choose strictly 
5 For detail of the proof, please refer to Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) appendix 
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higher level of insurance coverage under the securitized funding mode. This is because 
the cost of insurance to the borrower is the premium paid at the outset, whereas the 
benefit is the reduced interest to be paid. The borrower pays this interest only if its project 
is successful, an interest reduction is more valuable to a borrower with a higher success 
probability. Thus, higher quality borrowers enjoy higher expected utility directly led by 
higher success probability.^ 
Secondly, they prove that in the equilibrium information screening cost for borrower 
is higher under deposit funding mode than that for securitized funding mode. It avoids 
direct investor screening costs, because borrowers signal their quality with amount of 
insurance coverage. And as shown in the last paragraph, highest quality borrowers obtain 
highest insurance coverage available from the bank's capital. Therefore, a borrower 
obtaining as much coverage under the securitized funding mode as under the deposit 
funding mode would prefer the former. Thus they come to the conclusion that with 
asymmetric information, the best assets are securitized and the worst are funded with 
deposits. 
Demarzo and Duffie (1999) demonstrate how the presence of information 
6 There's a second reason: as a higher quality borrower chooses greater insurance coverage in equilibrium, 
providing risk-averse investors with better risk sharing and thus lowering the yield on the securitized loan. 
For the detail of the proof, refer to Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) p 382-292 Journal of Banking Finance. 
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asymmetries encouraged securitization. Assuming the originator is better informed about 
the credit quality of the borrower than the investor, the investor may set credit standards 
higher than the ones of the originator in order to protect himself. At the time the mortgage 
backed security is issued, the originator private information regarding the payoff of the 
security may cause illiquidity in the form of a downward-sloping demand curve for the 
security and the optimal strategy is to retain a portion of the asset in portfolio. It implies 
that if the originator does not wish to retain any portion of the mortgage backed security 
then she should sell the loans having the lowest degree of asymmetric information and 
retain those loans with higher risk. 
A review on Obav’s research work: 
Obay (2000) uses financial ratios as measures to examine financial characteristics of 
200 largest commercial banks that securitized during the year 1994-1995 reporting period. 
He points out the non-mortgage market for asset securitization is highly concentrated and 
dominated by credit card installment loans. Levels of securitization have great disparities 
ranging from less than 4 thousandths of a percent to 166% of total assets. 
He tests financial characteristics for securitizing and non-securitizing banks at both 
multivariate and univariate level. He finds the two groups of banks differ on an overall 
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base. At the univariate level, adopters and non-adopters of securitization differed in terms 
of assets, wholesale business, risk-based capital ratio, deposit to loan ratio, securitizable 
loan ratio and previous year's securitization level. None of the cost, return or portfolio 
variables are found to significantly differentiate between the two groups. It means that 
securitizing banks were neither more profitable, more cost efficient, nor better diversified 
than non-securitizing banks. 
Obay also examines the relation between securitizing volume and the characteristic 
variables. He points out that bank characteristics, measured by bank size and the ratios of 
international banking and wholesale business, have no weight on the securitization 
decision; neither did capital requirements. Instead, the decision as to how much to 
securitize is dictated by operational consideration (cost, return and liquidity), loan 
origination comparative advantage, and familiarity with the technique of securitization, 
that is prior involvement with the technique. 
This thesis seeks to update and improve Obay's examination of the differentiating 
characteristics in securitizing and non-securitizing banks. However, instead of examining 
bank characteristics at the commercial bank level, this thesis will study the data 
concerning the bank holding company level. Obay applies the data from the years of 
1994 and 1995 while this thesis is using the most recent data from the last quarter of year 
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2004. Instead of bank characteristics such as level of wholesale and international business, 
this thesis will include more operational characteristics such as efficiency ratios and 
portfolio composition. Ob ay only compares the mean difference between the two groups. 
This thesis applies a logistic regression to model the decision to securitize or not. This 
facilitates to reveal the relationship with both sign and magnitude. Furthermore, Obay 
puts all characteristics variables into a linear regression equation which encountered 
serious multicollinearity problems. In my paper, before the regression is carried, I test the 





III. Hypotheses and Design of the Tests 
A. Hypotheses 
In this thesis there are three questions to be answered: 
1. How do securitizing and non-securitizing banks differ based on bank characteristics? 
2. How does each characteristic jointly correlate with the decision to securitize? 
3. What is the relationship between bank characteristics and degree to which the bank 
uses securitization? Given a bank decides to securitize, what factors are linked to the 
amount of securitization? 
This section of the paper will describe the tests to investigate these questions and the 
hypotheses relating to previously discussed literature. Following this section I will break 
down the above three questions of the hypotheses. I choose three different statistical tests 
to answer each question. I will also discuss the logic for choosing them, as well as 
assumptions and difficulties addressed during the tests. 
I hypothesize that securitizing and non-securitizing banks are different based on 
liquidity risk, loan portfolio quality, portfolio composition, regulatory capital ratio, 
funding cost, efficiency ratio, profitability and size; these characteristics are related to 
bank's decision to securitize and degree of securitization. 
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Table 1: The expectation for each characteristic 
Relation with 
degree of 
Difference between securitization 
securitizing and Relation with amounts of 
non-securitizing securitization securitizing 
Bank characteristics banks* decision banks 
Liquidity risk Higher Positive Positive 
Loan quality Lower Negative Negative 
Regulatory capital ratio Lower Negative Negative 
Funding cost Higher Positive Positive 
Efficiency ratio Higher Positive Positive 
Profitability Higher Positive Positive 
Size Higher Positive Positive 
portfolio composition Higher** Positive Positive 
•ratios are higher or lower for securitizing group 
**the more securitizable loans there are, the more likely the bank is going to securitize 
In this section, I will discuss how the theories and research I have examined in the 
literature review lead to my hypothesis. Each characteristic is measured by financial 
ratios, introduced later. 
Liquidity risk 
As an alternative funding mechanism, securitization brings liquidity (Ambrose, 
LaCour-Little and Sanders, 2004) to originator. Higher liquidity need is an important 
motive for banks to securitize. Simply put, liquidity risk is supposed to be higher for 
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banks adopting securitization. A positive relation is thus expected between liquidity risk 
of the bank and decision or degree of securitization. The effort of securitization is to 
decrease liquidity risk by increasing liquidity. The securitizing bank would be thus more 
liquid than the same bank without securitization. But as securitization is a costly liquidity 
source, thus less liquid than one without liquidity need for securitizing. 
Portfolio quality 
Resolving information asymmetry, regulatory arbitrage and bankruptcy cost 
avoidance stories all predict that the best assets are to be securitized and the poor assets 
remain as deposit funding. Ambrose, LaCour-Little and Sanders (2003) apply a 
competing risks model to obtain the unbiased expectation of borrowers' prepayment and 
default risk. Their results show that securitized mortgage loans experience lower 
ex-post defaults than those retained in portfolio. Since information asymmetry story 
implies that high risk loans are retained while low risk loans are securitized, there should 
be a positive relationship between expected default probability and the probability of 
retaining the loan in portfolio. That is, higher risk loans as revealed by higher expected 
default probabilities are more likely to be retained in the portfolio. Thus, their finding 
supports the argument that banks have incentives to sell lower risk and retain higher risk 
assets in portfolio. 
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Loans with higher default risk^ are thus supposed to be retained on balance sheet. In 
other words, loan quality should be lower for securitizing banks and negatively correlated 
to the degree of securitization. 
Regulatory capital ratio 
By regulation, the capital level is tied to asset level to maintain some minimum 
capital-to-asset as capital to risk-weighted asset ratio^. When banks approach or fall 
below the minimum capital level, they may resort to securitization.^ Regulatory capital 
arbitrage may motivate banks with capital constraints to raise their regulatory capital 
ratios via securitization process. From the angle of capital saving, the regulatory capital 
constraint can be released through securitization. By repacking and selling off some 
on-balance-sheet assets, the bank could reduce the asset size and thus achieve the purpose 
of meeting capital requirements. Thus, higher probability and degree of securitization 
should be associated with lower capital r a t i o s � � 
Funding cost 
Leland and Skarabot, Pennacchi and Obay show that securitization enables funding 
7 Default risk may not be best indicator for "bad quality asset" as implied by information asymmetry theory. 
Level of information asymmetry depends on how hard to predict the default risk of the assets. A more 
suitable measure should be volatility of default risk. 
8 Regulatory capital ratios I applied here include Tier I risk-weighted capital ratio and total risk-weighted 
capital ratio which will be introduced in next section. 
9 Banks are expected to meet a minimum total risk-based capital ratio of 8 percent by Basel Accord. 
Securitization may be achieved indirectly by a bank selling assets to a securitizer, however, my test 
would not review this action. 
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without higher cost from issuing equity or borrowing intermediate funds. Banks with 
higher funding cost on their balance sheet are more likely to resort to securitize to avoid 
deposit insurance and capital reserves. 
What's more, the information asymmetry theory states that funding costs are lower 
for best assets under securitized funding mode compared to deposit funding mode. Thus 
funding cost of balance sheet assets should be higher for securitizing banks. 
Size 
Obay aruges that the larger the size of the bank, the higher the level of sophistication 
of the management team to be more capable carrying out complicated process of 
securitization. Also securitization usually requires high set-up cost that could be more 
likely to occur in large banks because of economic scales. 
Profitability and Efficiency ratio 
Securitization allows a bank to create assets, make income thereon, and yet put the 
assets off the balance sheet the moment they are transferred to the SPV. Thus, the income 
from the asset is accelerated and the assets disappear from the balance, as implied by 
capital saving and regulatory capital arbitrage arguments. Thus securitization should lead 
to an improvement in profitability in the sense of income-related and asset-related ratios. 
‘ . : 
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From another angle, securitization requires sophisticated management with stable and 
healthy performance of the originating bank. A commonly used efficiency measurement 
is defined as non-interest expense to gross revenue. Thus a lower e伍ciency ratio 
indicates better performance of the bank. Banks with "a better mode" of operation would 
be more likely to carry out securitization activities. Thus securitization is expected to be 
negatively related with efficiency ratio. 
Portfolio composition 
The information asymmetry theory implies that the best assets in terms of low 
degree of information asymmetry are preferred to be securitized. Portfolio composition 
shows weights of different types of loans and thus reveals the ease to which a portfolio 
can be assessed by an outsider and the degree to which it exhibits stable statistical 
properties. The higher weights of the securitizable loans are the larger potential to 
securitize. 
B. Design of the Tests 
To answer the first question that "how do securitizing and non-securitizing banks 
differ", I will carry out the multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) test for overall 
level of all characters and Wilcoxon test on single character basis. 
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The MANOVA test is a parametric test and an extension of univariate analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). It is used to assess group differences across multiple metric variables 
simultaneously. In my research, it tests whether securitizing and non-securitizing are the 
same or different based on the vectors of means of all variables. One advantage of 
running MANOVA here is to control for overall error. As shown in previous part, I will 
compare between securitizing and non-securitizing banks upon eight characteristics. If 
we run a series of eight separate ANOVAs for each characteristic, the type I error i.e., 
probability of incorrectly rejecting a true null hypothesis would be between 5% and 
340/0". 
There are a few assumptions to be met for the test to be valid: 1). Equality of 
variance-covariance matrices, 2). Independence of the observations. 
As to the first assumption, Hair et al. (1992) states that "its violation has minimal 
impact if the groups are of approximately of equal size". Thus, the MANOVA test will be 
done on securitizing and non-securitizing groups of same size, which will be discussed in 
next section. For the second assumption, a time-ordered effect (serial correlation) is 
major cause of violation. As this thesis only applies cross-sectional instead of time-series 
”Assume each of the eight tests could have a 5% probability of type I error. If all characteristics are 
perfectly correlated then the possibility of type I error is 5%. When all characteristics are uncorrelated then 
the type I error is calculated as 1-(.95八8)，which is 34%. 
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data, the problem is thus eliminated some extent. 
The null hypothesis is stated as follows: securitizing and non-securitizing groups are 
not different when compared on the basis of liquidity risk, loan quality, regulatory capital 
ratio, funding cost, efficiency ratio, profitability, portfolio composition and size. 
There are four tests provided by SAS to test the overall differences among groups 
which are Wilks' Lambda, Pillai's Trace, Hotelling-Lawley Trace and Roy's Greatest 
Root. Wilks' lambda is the most preferred one and thus will be used in my study. It 
measures the ratio of the within-groups sum of squares to the total sum of squares. Its 
values range from 0 to 1.0. Strong values indicate strong group differences and vise 
versa. 
The second test for question 1 is the Wilcoxon rank sum test for differences in the 
medians. Why do I choose Wilcoxon test instead of the t-test? Because distributions on 
the variables of the two groups of securitizing and non-securitizing banks fail to follow 
normal distribution with equal variance. This violates the assumption of the t-test. The 
Wilcoxon rank sum test tests on the medians instead of means. It is a widely used and 
powerful nonparametric procedure for testing differences between the medians of two 
populations, and it does not depend on the assumption of normality for the populations. 
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The null hypothesis of a two-tail test states as the difference between medians of the two 
samples is zero. In the Wilcoxon test, if each sample size is larger than 10, large-sample 
approximation formula will be used for testing the null hypothesis; thus, Z statistics will 
be presented. Size factor will be excluded in the test as the samples are matched groups 
with similar asset size. 
For question 2 "how does each factor jointly correlate with the decision to 
securitize", I will use a logistic regression to test the relation between the characteristics 
with securitization decision. The logistic model is a binary regression model. In the 
model, the dependent variable is either "0" or “1”，rather than any figure of securitization 
volume. “0” is assigned to non-securitizing banks and “1” is assigned to securitizing 
banks when the securitization volume is greater than zero. With this model we can test 
the effects of independent variables upon the dependent variable which is in binomial 
form. In other words, we test on the characteristic impact on "Yes" or "No" decision. A 
logistic equation is as follows: 
ln[p/(1-p)] = a+/5'X + eor 
[p/(1-p)] = exp(a+/^X + e) 
where: 
.� • • • . 
• • - r . . . 
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• In is the natural logarithm, logexp, where exp=2.71828. •. 
• p is the probability that the event Y occurs, p(Y=l), here means probability of 
securitization 
• p/(l-p) is defined as "odds ratio" 
• ln[p/(l-p)] is the log odds ratio, or "logistic" 
• X is the vector of independent variables, here means the eight characteristics 
• j 3 is the vector of coefficients 
• a is the constant term 
• e is the error term. 
The estimated probability is: 
p = 1/[1 + exp(-a -/9X)] 
With the above functional form: 
• if you let a + BX =0, then p = .50 
• as -a - BX gets really big, p approaches 1 
• as -a - BX gets really small, p approaches 0. 
A matching game is required again for the logistic regression test. Both tests base on 
the two observation groups of securitizing and non-securitizing banks. The Wilcoxon test 
examines on the differences of characteristics between the two groups while logistic test 
- . � • . ‘ 
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looks for relation between the characteristics and the decision to securitize (securitizing 
banks) or not (non-securitizing banks). Apparently, size plays a major role in affecting the 
decision. The problem with size is that if the securitizing banks were all large, there may 
be factors correlated with size so we would be loosing at the differentiating between large 
and small banks, not securitizing and non-securitizing banks. Thus I would exclude this 
factor while testing on other characteristics. I match securitizing banks with 
non-securitizing banks of similar asset size so as to eliminate possible biases. A measure 
called "Percentage Correction Prediction" was applied in SPSS test for the test power of 
logit regression. The "Percent Correct Predictions" statistic assumes that if the estimated 
p is greater than or equal to .5 then the event is expected to occur and not occur otherwise. 
By assigning these probabilities Os and Is the "Percent Correct Predictions" is calculated. 
The bigger this measure is, the better the model describes the decision. ^ ^ 
Question 3 asks what factors determine the amount of securitization a bank does 
given that it is a securitizing bank. To answer this question, linear regression will be 
carried out. A bank is not only faced with the decision of whether or not to securitize 
assets, but also must decide how much to securitize. The objective is to assess the relative 
contribution of each of the independent variables in explaining levels of asset 
12 My tests do not actually model the decision usually associated with a logistic model because of 
simultaneity of the dependent variable. Dependent variable could be instead, from data of previous period 
than that of independent variable. 
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securitization by banks. I will examine relation between every characteristic and 
securitization level individually as well in combination with all other characteristics. The 
volume of securitized assets to total assets is defined as the dependent variable in the 
linear regression model in this test. 
In my data, a major problem emerges in both multiple logistic and linear regressions, 
which is multicollinearity among independent variables. With multicollinearity it may be 
the case that even small changes in the data can produce wide swings in the parameter 
estimates. What's more, coefficients may have very high standard errors and low 
significance levels in spite of the fact that are jointly highly significant. Besides, 
coefficients may take the wrong sign and implausible magnitudes. In order to solve this 
problem, I will run a correlation test among all independent variables and do adjustments 
before the logistic and linear regression tests. I will drop some of the variables which 
describe the same characteristic and cause the high correlations. I will also separate those 
variables that have significant correlations into different test combinations. 
34 
IV. Data and Findings 
A. Data Source 
The data set I use is the Bank Holding Company Performance Report (BHCPR) 
from the database of Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. I use the data mainly from the 
Consolidated Financial Statements (FR Y-9C) for the last quarter of year 2004. A Bank 
Holding Company (BHC) by definition is a company that owns two or more banks, 
registered with governors of the US Federal Reserve System. The Bank Holding 
Company Performance Report (BHCPR) is an analytical tool produced by the Federal 
Reserve System for supervisory purposes. It is designed to assist analysts and examiners 
in determining a BHC's financial condition and performance based on financial 
statements, comparative ratios, trend analyses, and percentile ranks relative to its peers. 
Obay uses data from the same source but he chooses to use commercial bank data. I 
believe it is better to use data from the BHC since the securitization decision is made at 
the headquarters level instead of subsidiary level. Because banks are subject to legal 
lending limits, the largest loans are likely to be booked in the largest bank even when 
issued elsewhere within the BHC and the figure is shown on BHC's balance sheet. In my 
study, each BHC is treated as one single banking organization representing the 
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securitization activities and characteristics at integrated level. 
B. Selection of Sample BHCs 
By quarter 4 year 2004，there are 2605 observations of BHCs. Among the whole 
pool, 2267 banks have their assets observable, and 416 out of them have assets size larger 
than US$ 1 billion. Before taking a look at the description on the data, some BHC 
observations are dropped for three reasons: 
First, redundancy exists in counting parent company and the subsidiaries where both 
are registered as BHCs. For example, HSBC North America Holdings Inc. is the parent of 
HSBC Investments (North America) INC. and HSBC North America Inc., however, the 
BHC database counts all of three. 
Second, some bank holding companies' main business lines do not lie in banking, 
but in other financial services, such as insurance or consulting. For example, Deutsche 
Bank Trust Corporation is the asset management subsidiary of Taunus (a US subsidiary of 
Deutsche Bank). 
13 Capital adequacy requirements are enforced at both the BHC and individual bank level. 
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Third, some BHC performance reports provide incomplete data for the variables that 
I examine. This may also be linked to the second reason that some BHC are mainly doing 
other business and do not provide data related to banking operations. 
The following are tables of examples illustrating how I dropped redundant or 
ineligible observations. 
Table 2: BHCs Kept or Dropped within HSBC Group 
Name of the BHC Business Nature Status in the Sample 
HSBC North America Bank Holding Company of HSBC in Keep 
Inc. North America with major business in 
banking 
HSBC North America Bank Holding Company of HSBC in Drop 
Holdings Inc. North America including major 
business other than banking 
HSBC Investments Formally as Household International Drop 
r (North America) Inc. Inc. and acquired by HSBC Holding 
pic as a wholly owned subsidiary 
HSBC Finance Credit card issuers and consumer Drop 
Corporation lenders 





Table 3: BHCs Kept or Dropped within CitiGroup 
Name of the BHC Business Nature Status in the Sample 
Citicorp Inc. Bank Holding Company with major Keep 
business in banking 
Citigroup Inc Bank Holding Company including other Drop 
major business such as insurance 
Citigroup Holding Bank Holding Company including major Drop 
Company business other than banking and without 
regulatory capital ratios on balance sheet 
Table 4: BHCs Kept or Dropped within Deutsche Bank Group 
Name of the BHC Business Nature Status in the Sample 
Taunus Corporation US Banking Holding Company of Keep 
Deutsche Bank 
Deutsche Bank Trust Asset management subsidiary of Drop 
Corporation Deutsche Bank in US 
I drop those BHCs with inadequate data required for my test reported in the BHCPR. 
I also drop those not operating mainly in banking field by referring to BHCs' websites. If 
the parent company has most of its activities in banking, then I keep the parent and I drop 
its subsidiaries. But when the parent also includes other essential parts such as insurance, 
I keep the banking subsidiary while dropping other subsidiaries as well as the parent. 
Citigroup Inc., originally the largest bank in terms of asset size, has been dropped 
because it is a BHC that includes Travelers Insurance whose main activity are outside of 
banking. After dropping Citigroup Inc, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. then becomes largest 





This left me with 367 BHCs in the whole target group (asset size larger than US$ 
1 billion). Within that group 56 banks did securitization. However, three observations out 
of 56 securitizing banks are excluded as extreme v a l u e s " . The clean data group of 53 
securitizing banks is set as test sample for MANOVA test and linear regression. List of 
the 53 securitizing and the matching group of 53 non-securitizing banks are shown in 
appendix table 2 and 3. 
C. BHC Size and Description on Securitization 
n . Description of BHC Size 
Among the banks with asset size over US$1 billion, number of securitizing versus 
banks versus non-securitizing banks is about 1: 6 (53 versus 314). Nevertheless, total 
assets of the 53 securitizing banks add up to US$ 6356 billion, which is 3.68 times of that 
for all non-securitizing banks left in the group (US$ 1728 billion). The average asset size 
for the 53 securitizing group is US$ 120 billion and that for non-securitizing group is 
US$ 5 billion. In other words, securitizing banks are on average over 20 times larger in 
For these three banks, securitization volumes as percentage to total assets were trivial (i.e., less than .1%) 
and may distort the test result. The banks and percentage to securitize were shown in the table below the list 
of 53 securitizing banks in appendix. 
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term of size than the non-securitizing bank. Also, among the 53 securitizing banks, 43% 
are from top 50 banks and 75% are from top 100 banks. Thus, we can conclude that 
securitization concentrates in large banks. 
Table 5: Top 10 Banks Ranked by Assets Size and Their ABS Outstanding 
Name of the Bank Assets Percentage Securitization Percentage 
(bnUS$) to all Volume to assets 




1 J.P. Morgan Chase & Co 1,138.47 14.08 95.84 8.42 
2 Bank of America Corporation 1,089.31 13.47 86.75 7.96 
3 CitiCorp 899.60 11.13 339.61 37.75 
4 Wachovia Corporation 436.70 5.40 61.14 14.00 
5 W e l l s Fargo & Company 421.55 5.21 202.48 48.03 
6 Taunus Corporation 321.38 3.98 27.03 8.41 
7 U.S. Bancorp 192.84 3.12 0.40 0.21 
8 HSBC North America Inc. 155.26 3.01 4.74 3.05 
9 National City Corporation 136.37 2.88 3.38 2.48 
10 Citizens Financial Group, 134.44 2.50 0 0 
Inc.* 
•The largest bank not securitizing is Citizens Financial Group, Inc. with asset of US$134,436,100. It didn't 
carry out any securitization activity in the previous three quarters, either. It's the US banking arm of Royal 
Bank of Scotland. 
As suggested by the literature, size of the bank plays a major role in securitization 
activity. Large banks are more likely to securitize with higher securitization degree. I will 
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examine other characteristics besides size factor in this thesis. Even if I picked up the 
largest 53 non-securitizing banks to match with 53 securitizing banks, the latter group is 
much smaller in average assets size. Quite possibly the difference in the variables shown 
by the test would be due to the size effect instead of securitization activities. That's the 
reason why I match the smallest 20 securitizing banks with 40-nonsecuritizing banks with 
similar assets size. First, I pick the 20 smallest banks from the bottom of the securitizing 
group. They are then matched on a one-by-one base with 40 non-securitizing banks with 
closest asset size. It means for each of the 20 securitizing banks, I choose its next smaller 
and next larger non-securitizing banks. Thus there are two non-securitizing banks 
matched with each securitizing banks with closest assets size. Why do I choose only 20 
securitizing banks from the whole 53 securitizing banks? Though the 20 securitizing 
banks form a small sample, adding more securitizing banks would again break the 
balance and make size of the securitizing group overwhelming. Also, the Wilcoxon test 
only requires the sample size for each comparing group to be no less than 10 to apply the 
Z test, whereas sample size is 60 under Logistic test. Therefore, the matching groups are 
set as target sample for the Wilcoxon and logistic test.^^ 
15 As both tests do not require the matching groups to hold same number of observations, 20 securitizing 
banks were thus matched with 40 non-securitizing with similar asset size. List of the banks chosen as 
sample would be shown in appendix. 
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Table 6: Banks in the Study: 20 Size-matched Securitizing banks 
Name Assets ($mn) Securitization % of Assets 
(Smn) 
FIRST BANCORP 15，177.66 2.56 0.02 
DORAL FINANCIAL 
CORPORATION 14,983.40 10,715.61 71.52 
MERCANTILE BANKSHARES 
CORPORATION 14,303.02 125.95 0.88 
SOUTH FINANCIAL GROUP, 
THE 13,649.52 20.68 0.15 
FIRST NATIONAL OF 
NEBRASKA, INC. 12,074.86 2,577.33 21.34 
INTERNATIONAL 
BANCSHARES 
CORPORATION 9,440.64 30.97 0.33 
R&G FINANCIAL 
CORPORATION 9,188.85 3,932.31 42.79 
FRANKLIN RESOURCES, INC. 8,220.02 791.24 9.63 
FIRST BANKS, INC. 7,566.41 23.15 0.31 
SUSQUEHANNA 
BANCSHARES, INC. 7,449.86 516.22 6.93 
UNITED BANKSHARES, INC. 6,2^9.65 28.20 0.45 
EAST WEST BANCORP, INC. 5,567.84 65.51 1.18 
IRWIN FINANCIAL 
CORPORATION 5,388.75 591.75 10.98 
MB FINANCIAL, INC 5,069.41 8.50 0.17 
AMCORE FINANCIAL, INC. 4,878.73 135.27 2.77 
MAINSOURCE FINANCIAL 
GROUP 1,556.71 500.59 32.16 
FARMERS & MERCHANTS 
INVESTMENT, INC. 1,404.49 274.16 19.52 
AMERICAN NATIONAL 
CORPORATION 1,370.23 63.78 4.65 
LAURITZEN CORPORATION 1,166.10 462.04 39.62 
UNITED NATIONAL 
CORPORATION 1,043.42 47.71 4.57 
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SKY FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. 14,665.16 
BOK FINANCIAL CORPORATION 14,435.56 
COMMERCE BANCSHARES, INC. 14,153.30 
CITY NATIONAL CORPORATION 13,982.61 
CBI-KANSAS, INC. 13,829.53 
FIRST CITIZENS BANCSHARES, 
INC. 13,019.10 
FBOP CORPORATION 12,912.59 
TCF FINANCIAL CORPORATION 12,114.08 
INVESTORS FINANCIAL SERVICES 
CORP. 10,793.39 
VALLEY NATIONAL BANCORP 10,630.85 
WILMINGTON TRUST 
CORPORATION 9,667.50 
ESB ACQUISITION CORP. 9,634.62 
BANK OF HAWAII CORPORATION 9,602.51 
OLD NATIONAL BANCORP 8,982.40 
HUDSON UNITED BANCORP 8,833.76 
DISCOUNT BANCORP, INC. 8,600.03 
TRUSTMARK CORPORATION 8，150.63 
CITIZENS BANKING 
CORPORATION 7,658.68 
FIRSTBANK HOLDING COMPANY 7,274.52 
PROVIDENT BANKSHARES 
CORPORATION 6,397.84 
NEWALLIANCE BANCSHARES, INC. 6,283.30 
BANK LEUMI LE-ISRAEL 
CORPORATION 5,588.38 
FIRST NATIONAL BANKSHARES OF 





COMMUNITY FIRST BANKSHARES, 
INC. 5,477.72 
INVESTORS BANCORP, MHC 5,324.48 
ALABAMA NATIONAL 
BANCORPORATION 5’ 125.76 
EASTERN BANK CORPORATION 5,055.85 
SILICON VALLEY BANCSHARES 4,894.16 
2). Types of Securitization 
There are seven different securitization types according to asset class that are 
documented by BHCPR. Three banks are involved in all seven asset type-securitization 
activities: J P Morgan & Chase，Bank of America Inc. and CitiCorp, which are exactly the 
top three BHC ranking by size in the group. Please look at Table 8 which shows number 
of banks and amount of securitization for each asset type-group securitization. 
1-4 family residential loans group is most popular type of securitization with the 
largest weight of 66.32% to total securitization volume, and is practiced by 36 banks 
among the 53 banks. It is apparent that 1-4 family residential loans securitization is 
essential to the economy, because mortgage lending enables people to afford their house 
and securitization provides liquidity to the mortgage market. 
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1-4 Family Loans Home Commercial Other 
Residential Credit Card and Equity and Industrial Consumer Auto 
Loans Receivables Leases Lines Loans Loans Loans Total 
Volume 822.50 239.37 87.49 31.63 27.34 16.81 15.11 1,240.25 
Weight to the 
total volume 66.32 19.30 7.05 2.55 2.20 1.36 1.22 100.00 
% 
No. of banks 




volume of 22.85 26.60 4.37 2.26 3.04 1.29 1.08 NA 
securitization 
per BHC 
The credit card receivables group ranks second with 19.3% of the volume of bank 
securitization, which is concentrated in a few banks. Only 9 banks in the whole group did 
credit card receivables backed securitization and the average volume is comparably larger. 
The average volume outstanding for each BHC is US$ 26.6 billion. In contrast, the auto 
loans group has rather smaller weight as 1.22% but spread in 14 banks. The average deal 
size is less than 1/20 of the average deal size of credit card receivables group. 
Credit card backed ABS has been issued in the public debt market since 1987. Now 
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it is the second largest and most liquid securitization market. The large size corresponds 
to the rapid growth in the credit card market overall as consumers have come to rely on 
credit cards as a convenient method of payment for an expanding universe of good and 
services as well as a means of accessing credit. US credit card securitization outstanding 
in the first quarter of year 2003 was US$401.6 billions, which takes up 25.2% of Total 
ABS amount^This means that the bank sample above accounts for about half of credit 
card receivables securitization. 
Also, the credit card industry is internally a highly concentrated industry - largest 
players have the economies of scale. Obviously, therefore, the credit card securitization 
market is also a highly concentrated market. 
These above two reasons help us to understand the concentration and larger size 
phenomenon of credit card receivable group. 
16 Source from Bond Market Association 
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IV. Results 
This section gives the results of the tests described in section II. Part A will be 
findings from Wilcoxon tests and MANOVA test on difference between securitizing and 
non-securitizing based on the variables representing bank characteristics. Then partial 
correlation results will be presented for the purpose of dropping variables with serious 
correlations. Part C and D show results of logistic regression and linear regression tests, 
and reveal the relation between securitizing decision/degree and the financial factors. 
A. Difference Between Securitizing and Non-securitizing BHC Characteristics 
As introduced in section II’ I will examine seven characteristics: liquidity risk, 
portfolio quality, regulatory capital ratio, funding cost, profitability, efficiency ratio, and 
portfolio composition. I will use multiple variables to measure some characteristics as 
they will more accurately measure the characteristic from different aspects. For example, 
liquidity risk can be measured by composition of bank's deposits, such as weights of core 
deposits and volatile deposits. From another angle, ratio of reserves to deposits also 
shows the bank's liquidity need. Obay also uses multiple variables to describe each 




ly Univariate Test between Securitizing and Non-securitizing banks Characteristics 
As discussed in previous section, Wilcoxon sum rank test will be used to examine 
the medians of ratios that describe securitizing and non-securitizing banks on univariate 
level. The ratios are selected directly from or calculate from BHC Performance Report. 
Table Al in the appendix gives the BHC Performance Report source of each of the 
variables to be tested. Using the Wilcoxon test, 20 securitizing banks matched by 40 
non-securitizing banks that have been size-matched. 
Liquidity 
I select five measures of liquidity which I explain and analyze in the following part. 
The five measures are shown in Table 9. 
Core Deposits to Total Deposits Ratio: Core deposits represent the stable part of 
deposits available to fund longer-term assets. They are retail accounts with principal 
amounts less than $100,000. Though individually not contractually long-term, the 
portfolio provides stable long term funding. The larger the portion of core deposits is, the 
less the needs for liquidity and securitization. The mean value of this ratio is smaller for 
the group of securitizing banks. Wilcoxon test also shows negative sign on the median 
difference at 1% significant level. A lower core deposits ratio indicates securitizing banks 
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Table 9: Liquidity Risk 
Ratios Expected Mean on 20 Mean on 40 Wilcoxon Test 
Value for Securitizing Non-securitizing Test Result Statistics 
Securitizing Banks % Banks % for (P-value) 
Banks Securitizing 1. 
(higher Banks | 
liquidity risk) 
Core Lower 74.35 83.56 Lower -3.39 
Deposits/Total (.0007)*** 
Deposits % 
Volatile Higher 48.65 30.83 Higher 1.97 
Deposits/Deposits (.0485)** % 
Reserves/Deposits Lower 43.17 53.64 Insignificant -1.15 
% (.2492) 
Net Federal Funds Higher 2.77 2.13 Higher 3.03 
Purchased/Assets (.0024)*** 
% 
Loans/Deposits % Higher 101.53 80.38 Insignificant 0.19 
(.8477) 
Note: 
Core Deposits are the sum of demand deposits, deposit accounts that are subject to negotiable orders of 
withdrawal or automatic transfer from the savings accounts, time deposits (excluding brokered deposits) 
with balances under $100,000, money market deposit accounts, other savings accounts, and other 
non-interest-bearing deposit balances; 
Volatile Deposits are brokered deposits less than $100,000 with a remaining maturity of one year or less, 
foreign offices time deposits with a remaining maturity of one year or less, time deposits of less than 
$100,000 with a remaining maturity of one year or less, and federal funds and repos purchased; 
Reserves are cash and balances due from depository institutions, Securities, and Federal funds sold and 
securities purchased under agreements to resell; 
Net Federal Funds Purchased are federal funds sold in domestic offices / Federal funds purchased in 
domestic offices. 
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Volatile Deposit to Total Deposit Ratio: As opposed to core deposits, volatile 
deposits, made up of brokered deposits and time deposits less than $100,000 with 
maturity equal or less one year, federal funds purchased, are more likely to be withdrawn 
upon maturity without warning and thus reflect higher liquidity risk. Also, they require 
higher interest expense compared to core deposits. Thus, a bigger portion of volatile 
deposits in total deposit may stimulate securitization from both the consideration of 
liquidity risk and funding cost. Both the mean value of the ratios and Wilcoxon test result 
is higher for securitizing group. It follows the intuition that securitizing banks face higher 
liquidity risk represented by larger portion of volatile deposit. 
Reserve to Deposit Ratio: It is a measurement of degree to which highly liquid 
assets are available to pay out deposits. Banks can either make loans from deposits or 
keep them as reserves. If the bank chooses to make fewer loans and save more reserves, it 
has a higher Reserve to Deposit Ratio. Thus the bank has less liquidity need, and then 
there is less motivation to securitize. In other words, the higher the ratio, the lower needs 
of securitization. The mean value of this ratio is lower for securitizing banks, while the 
Wilcoxon test shows a negative sign but without significance. The lower ratio indicates 
higher liquidity risk for the securitizing banks which follows my hypothesis that higher 
liquidity risk motivates securitization. 
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Net Federal Funds Purchased to Assets Ratio: This liquidity measure is the 
difference between federal funds purchased and sold as a percentage to assets. The 
Federal funds (Fed funds) market is the market for overnight and short-term unsecured 
lending of excess reserve funds between banks. Such lending is referred to as "Fed funds 
sold" by the lending bank and "Fed funds purchased" by the borrowing bank. If a bank 
has excess reserves, it can sell the reserves and record the sale as an asset. If a bank needs 
funds to meet either its reserve requirements or other obligations, it can purchase the 
excess reserves of another bank. Thus, a higher ratio reflects higher liquidity risk, and a 
negative ratio indicates excess liquidity. The mean value of this ratio is higher for 
securitizing banks, and Wilcoxon test reveals larger median at 1% significant level 
compared to non-securitizing banks. The results show that securitizing banks have higher 
liquidity risk as having heavier portion of borrowing from other banks. 
Loan to Deposit Ratio: This is similar to the Reserves to Deposits Ratio. Loans make 
up a large portion of the bank's assets and its principal obligations are the deposits that 
can be withdrawn on request. Thus this is a type of debt coverage ratio, and it measures 
position of the bank with regard to liquidity risk. Higher loan to deposits indicates more 
risk from a debt standpoint. In other words, the higher the ratio the less liquidity the bank 
has. It is also a measure of the degree to which the BHC is a traditional bank. The mean 
value of this ratio is higher for securitizing banks indicating a higher liquidity risk they 
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face. The Wilcoxon test also shows a positive sign but fails to be significant. 
All liquidity indicators show securitizing banks present higher liquidity needs. This 
agrees with the hypothesis that higher liquidity risk promotes securitization as an 
alternative funding mechanism. Obay (2000) also finds that liquidity risk is higher for 
securitizing bank measured by the ratio of Deposits / Assets. 
Portfolio Quality 
The second characteristic to be examined is portfolio quality. 
Table 10: Portfolio Quality 
Ratios Expected Mean on 20 Mean on 40 Wilcoxon Test 
Value for Securitizing Non-securitizing Test Result Statistics 




Charge-offs Higher .90 .22 Higher 1.14 
/Loans % (.0485)** 
Allowances/Loans Higher .98 .17 Insignificant 1.97 
% (.2510) 
Provision/Loans Higher 2.32 1.42 Insignificant 1.06 
% (.2492) 
Charge-offs to Loans: It is loan losses net of any recoveries as a percentage of loans. 
Charge-offs are loans which have been written off the books and charged against the 
；? •• allowance for loan losses. This ratio measures the overall rate of credit losses incurred 
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and thus indicates the portfolio quality. Obay discusses that the better the quality of 
repackaged assets, the lesser the enhancement that is needed to realize an improved return 
and the better the acceptance of the ABS issue among investors. Besides, there is the 
general belief that the market will only permit the sale of high quality repackaged assets 
implied by information asymmetry theory. Therefore, higher charge-off ratio representing 
lower quality of the remaining assets on balance sheet is likely to be associated with 
securitization. The mean value of the ratio is higher for securitizing banks which follows 
the above intuition. Wilcoxon test also shows significantly positive sign on the median 
difference. 
There are two other similar measurements from balance sheet and income statement 
respectively: 
Allowances to Loans: The allowance for loan losses is an accounting estimate of 
credit losses inherent in a loan portfolio. This credit balance account reflects the amount 
set aside to provide a cushion to absorb losses on outstanding loans. Both the mean value 
and Wilcoxon test result (insignificant) show higher allowances to loans ratio for 
securitizing banks. The amount carried in this account shall represent possible losses 
which may be incurred in the normal payoff of outstanding loans, and shall be considered 
as a deduction from total loans shown on the financial statement in order that the asset 
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reflects fair market value. Thus average ratio of higher allowances to loans for 
securitizing bank follows the intuition that banks securitize their best assets and remain 
poorer quality loans on balance sheet. 
Provision to Loans: Provision for loan loss expense (debit) creates a reserve for loan 
losses (credit or contra-asset against loans). When a loan is charged off, the loan is 
removed (credit) and the reserve is reduced (debit). The provision for loan losses is an 
expense item that adds to a bank's loan loss reserve (a contra-asset account). Banks 
increase their provision for loan losses in anticipation of credit quality problems in their 
loan portfolio. A higher average provision to loan ratio here for securitizing banks shows 
their poorer loan quality and thus agrees with the expectation, but the difference, while 
large, is statistically insignificant. 
As discussed in previous section, banks tend to securitize their better quality assets 
while retaining worse quality assets on balance sheet. Obay (2000) discusses that bank 
regulators force banks to write off bad loans while appreciating loans must be carried at 
book value. This generates an understatement of bank equity that is available for loan 
losses. The bank sells appreciating low-risk and high-value loans in order to realize 
capital gains that would balance the understatement brought to the book value of equity 
capital. Thus a higher level of loan charge-offs, allowances and provision indicating the 
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lower quality of the remaining assets in the bank is likely to promote securitization 
activity. 
Funding Cost 
The next characteristic to be tested is funding cost. 
Table 11: Funding Cost 
Ratios Expected Mean on 20 Mean on 40 Wilcoxon Test 
Value for Securitizing Non-securitizing Test Result Statistics 




Deposit Interest Higher 1.06 .81 Higher 2.29 
Expense/Total (.0220)** 
Deposits % 
Deposit Interest Expense / Total Deposits: A higher ratio means the bank pays a 
comparatively higher cost to attract deposits. Imagine some bank experiencing shortages 
of funds and forced to reply on volatile deposits, such as brokered deposits. It is likely to 
require higher interest on the borrowed funds'' and thus exhibit a higher funding cost in 
terms of Deposit Interest Expense over Total Deposits. In this case, banks may find it 
more efficient to securitize assets rather than pay high funding costs on the volatile 
deposits. The Wilcoxon test reveals positive sign for the difference at 5% significance 






level which means this ratio is higher for securitizing group. The mean of the ratio is also 
higher for securitizing banks. These results indicate higher funding cost for securitizing 




The next characteristic to be examined is regulatory capital adequacy ratio. Bank 
regulators require banks to maintain at least a minimum ratio of equity capital to its credit 
risk-weighted exposure. The Basel Committee on Banking has set this ratio to permit 
banks to absorb losses without becoming insolvent, in order to protect depositors. As 
discussed in previous sections, banks facing capital constraints or approaching the 
minimum capital adequacy may securitize their best assets to release the capital 
constraints and bring up their capital adequacy ratios. This characteristic will be 
measured by two ratios from the BHC Performance Report as shown in the following 
table. 
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Table 12: Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Ratios Expected Mean on 20 Mean on 40 Wilcoxon Test 
Value for Securitizing Non-securitizing Test Result Statistics 
Securitizing Banks % Banks % for (P-value) 
Banks (lower Securitizing 
regulatory Banks 
capital ratio) 
Tier I Risk-Based Lower 17.14 12.44 Lower -2.10 
Capital % (.0359)** 
Total Risk-Based Lower 18.70 14.28 Lower -1.68 
Capital % (.0921)* 
The two capital adequacy ratios in the table are used to measure the adequacy of the 
bank's risk weighted capital, where Tier I and Total Risk-based Capital are the 
numerators and Risk-Weighted Assets is the denominator. 
Risk-Weighted Assets are assets classified in categories with specific risk weights. 
The risk weight assigned to a particular asset determines the percentage of that asset 
which is added with all other risk-weighted assets to determine the bank's total 
Risk-Weighted Assets. 
Tier I capital is core equity capital available to meet regulatory capital requirements 
18 The mean applied here, also known as arithmetic mean, is the average of the variables in the sample 
whereas median is the value of the number in the middle of the set of ordered variables. The wilcoxon test 
applies median instead of means as explained in part III. The median of Tier I Risk-Based Capital for 20 
securitizing banks is lower (10.65) than that for 40 non-securitizing banks (13.12); the median of Total 
Risked-Based Capital for 20 securitizing banks is lower (13.28) than that for 40 non-securitizing (15.96). 
These numbers agree with the results of wilcoxon test. 
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being the sum of common shareholders' equity, common shares, contributed surplus, 
retained earnings, non-cumulative preferred shares plus minority interests in subsidiaries 
from Tier 1 capital minus goodwill. According to the Basel Accord (both the Basel I and 
Basel II)，the Teri I capital adequacy ratio must exceed 4 percent. 
Total Risk-based Capital is the sum of Tier I，Tier II，and Tier III capital^ 9，where 
applicable, less deductions for total risk-based capital (The amount of any intentional 
reciprocal cross-holdings of BHCs capital instruments, and any other deductions for total 
risk-based capital as determined by the Federal Reserve). According to the Basel Accord 
the Total Risk-based Capital Ratio must exceed 8 percent. 
As suggested in previous discussion, banks are more likely to securitize facing 
capital constraint. Thus, securitizing bank is expected to reveal a lower capital adequacy 
ratio. Though the mean values of the two ratios are higher for non-securitizing banks, 
Wilcoxon test results support my hypothesis with negative signs at 5% and 10% 
significance level, respectively. The reverse signs are probably due to dispersion from 
normal distribution of the sample. As the distributions of the two ratios present positive 
19 Tier II and Tier III Capitals are the supplementary constituents of total regulatory capital. Tier II capital 
includes cumulative preferred shares; subordinate debt; property revaluation reserves; and general 
allowances for loan losses. Tier III capital consists mainly of certain short-term subordinated liabilities. 
I 
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skewness, it makes more sense to compare the medians instead of the means. The two 
negative signs on the medians show that total risk-based capital ratio and tier I risk-based 
capital ratio are lower for securitizing banks. As stated in the hypothesis, banks with 
lower capital adequacy ratio (higher capital constraints) may be more probably refer to 
securitization. Thus this result agrees with the hypothesis. Obay also shows lower 
risk-based capital ratio for securitizing banks in his test on commercial banks. 
Profitability and Efficiency 
Profitability and efficiency characteristics are measured by following ratios: 
Table 13: Profitability and Efficiency 
Ratios Expected Mean on 20 Mean on 40 Wilcoxon Test 
Value for Securitizing Non-securitizing Test Result Statistics 





Return on Higher 1.82 .82 Higher 1.75 
Assets % (.0798)* 
Return on Higher 11.79 11.57 Insignificant .0627 
Equity % (.9430) 
Efficiency Ratio Lower 53.80 64.34 Lower -2.04 
o/o (.0415)** 
Return on Assets (ROA): Defined as net income over total assets in the BHC 
i i 
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Performance Report, it is a measurement of bank's profitability and performance. 
Academic research so far has not presented any theory on effect of securitization upon 
overall banks' profitability. An easy way to test the profitability difference between 
securitizing and non-securitizing banks is to measure the relationship between 
securitizing volume and profit. ROA is higher for securitizing banks in Wilcoxon test at 
10% significance level. It supports the hypothesis that profitability is higher for 
securitizing banks. As an important measure (Hempel et al. 1990 p58) of bank 
performance, ROA could be substantially augmented by removing the securitized assets 
from their books and generating profits with the proceeds. Obay (2000) also gets the 
same result from his test. 
Return on Equity (ROE) is a more moderate measure of a bank's profitability while 
ROA may change dramatically due to change in assets. Though Wilcoxon test loses 
significance, the mean value of this ratio is higher for securitizing banks as expected. 
Efficiency ratio: It is defined as non-interest expense over gross revenue (summation 
of interest income and non-interest income). As margins shrink and the financial industry 
becomes more competitive, many banks seek to become more efficient and maintain 
profitability. This ratio gives us the cost of each dollar of revenue earned. As a general 
rule, the lower a financial institution's efficiency ratio, the better the performance. If one 
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associates securitization with efficiency, banks with "better mode" of operation would be 
more likely to carry out securitization activities. Wilcoxon test as well as the mean value 
show that efficiency ratio is lower for securitizing banks. As discussed before, 
securitization requires large set-up cost and sophistication of the securitizing bank. Thus 
banks with "better modes" of operation represented by a lower efficiency ratio would be 
more likely to securitize. 
Finally, portfolio composition is measured with following ratios: 
Table 14: Portfolio Composition 
Ratios Expected Mean on 20 Mean on 40 Wilcoxon Test 
Value for Securitizing Non-securitizing Test Result Statistics 
Securitizing Banks % Banks % for (P-value) 
Banks Securitizing 
Banks 
Real Estate Higher 63.17 66.41 Insignificant .74 
Loans/Loans % (-4110) 
Consumer & Higher 15.07 17.97 Insignificant .45 
Industrial (.6493) 
Loans/Loans % 
Retail Higher 14.43 9.64 Insignificant .77 
loans/loans % (.4423) 
Portfolio composition is measured by the weights of three major types of loans as 
percentage to total loans shown in the table. The ratios are supposed to be higher for 
securitizing banks as they indicate higher securitizable loan ratio. Information asymmetry 
theory implies that best assets in terms of low degree of information asymmetry are 
？ 
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preferred to be securitized. The above three ratios show the weights of each type of loans 
and thus reveals the ease to which a portfolio can be assessed by an outsider and the 
degree to which it exhibits stable statistical properties. The higher weights of those 
securitizable loans are the larger potential to securitize. However, none of the three 
measures for portfolio composition turns to be significantly higher for securitizing banks. 
In the above tests, the size factor was excluded, and I used seventeen variables 
representing liquidity, loan quality, capital adequacy ratio, funding cost, profitability and 
efficiency, and portfolio composition. Among all variables, nine ratios were significantly 
different for their medians and all with same direction as expected. As described in the 
hypothesis, the results indicate that securitizing and non-securitizing banks do differ 
based on all characteristics except portfolio composition. Securitizing banks have higher 
liquidity risk, poorer loan quality, lower capital adequacy ratio, higher funding cost, as 
well as higher profitability and efficiency, which all agree with my hypotheses. 
2). Joint Test of Difference between Mean Values of the Characteristics 
In this part, the MANOVA test are carried out on the 53 securitizing matched by 53 
non-securitizing banks, because the test requires the same sample size for each group (see 
section III). Lists of the sample groups are shown in appendix Table A2 and A3. 
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The test statistic of Wilks' lamda significantly rejects the null hypothesis that the two 
groups are not statistically different based on all variables. This finding is in accordance 
with what Obay (2000) found. The statistic value is .715, and the F value is 2.37 with p 
value of .005. Over 70% of the variance is not explained by group differences. This result 
indicates that the overall financial characteristics of the two groups are significantly 
different at the 1% level. 
B. Correlations Among Variables 
The above tests look at individual characteristics of securitizing versus 
non-securitizing banks. In the remaining two tests, I will investigate the joint effects of 
BHC characteristics on securitization using. As described in section III above 
multicollinearity in variables may present severe problems when analyzing joint effects 
of characteristics. To address this problem, I carry out correlation analysis among all 
characteristic variables. 
I drop variables that are highly correlated and describing same characteristics. 
Correlation also exists among variables indicating different characteristics. Thus, one 
single set of variables could lose some essential factor in describing one particular 
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characteristic. I then develop several groups of variables to better cover all 
characteristics. 
Partial correlation test is carried out on the 20 securitizing matched with 40 
non-securitizing banks. Thus suitable variables could be picked up for tests in next stage. 
I consider correlation coefficient of over 80% to be problematic. The whole correlation 
matrix for all variables is shown in Table 15. 
1). Correlation within Same Characteristics Class 
Liquidity risk: 
No significant correlation found except for core deposit/deposit with volatile 
deposit/deposit which is -.81 at 5% significance level. A negative correlation states that 
the more the core deposit weights, the less volatile deposit weights and less liquidity 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The three credit risk of portfolio measures highly correlate with each other. Thus, 
only one of the three ratios could be combined with other indicators in the 
regression each time. 
Table 16 Correlation among Portfolio Quality Measures 
Charge-off/Loans Provision/Loans Allowance/Loans 
Charge-off/Loans 1 0.99*** 0.98*** 
Provision/Loans 0.99*** 1 0.99*** 
Allowance/Loans 0.98*** 0.99*** 1 
Capital adequacy ratios: 
The two ratios are highly correlated with coefficient as 0.99 at 5% significance 
level. This means the two variables could not be shown in the regression equation 
simultaneously. 
Profitability ratios: 
Coefficient between ROE income and ROA is 0.42 at 5% significance level. 
Both of them could be input the test at the same time. 
2). Correlation among Different Characteristics 
i j 
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One interesting finding is that the three portfolio quality measurements and ‘ 
capital adequacy ratios highly correlate with the profitability variables i.e. ROA 
with positive sign. ROE as a moderate profitability measure does not have such 
high correlation with other variables. Thus, I would use ROE in the regression tests 
and test the relations of those characteristics with securitization decision in separate 
combinations if ROA is applied. 
Table 17: Correlation among ROA, Capital Adequacy and Portfolio Quality Ratios 
ROA Charge-off/ Provision/ Allowance/ Tier I Total 
Loan Loans Loans Risk-based Risk-based 
Capital Ratio Capital Ratio 
ROA 1 .89*** .87*** .85*** .78*** 79*** 
Charge-offi'Loan .89*** 1 .99*** .98*** .53*** .55*** 
Provision/Loans .87*** .99*** 1 .99*** .49*** .51*** 
Allowance/Loans .85*** .98*** .99*** 1 .46*** .48*** 
Tier I Risk-based .78*** .53*** .49*** .46*** 1 .99*** 
Capital Ratio 
Total Risk-based .79*** .55*** .51*** .48*** .99*** 1 
Capital Ratio 
The Reserves to Deposits ratios is found to be highly correlated with capital 
adequacy ratio. It follows the intuition that banks with high reserves level provide 
adequate capital cushion represented by higher capital adequacy ratio. Therefore, I 
will use other liquidity measures to combine with the capital adequacy ratio in the 
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joint test. 
Table 18: Correlations between Liquidity Risk and Capital Adequacy Ratios 
Reserves/Deposits Tier I Risk-based Total Risk-based 
Capital Ratio Capital Ratio 
Reserves/Deposits 1 .77*** .75*** 
Tier I Risk-based Capital Ratio .77*** 1 .99*** 
Total Risk-based Capital Ratio .75*** .99*** 1 
C. To Explain The "Decision" on Securitization 
In this section, Logistic regression is carried out to test the joint effect of the 
on characteristics on securitization "decision". 
According to the correlation results, I combine the variables without 
significant correlations to run the joint logistic test^^ Variables with significantly 
high correlations are separately put into different combinations. 
2° The causation is problematic because the independent variables are contemporaneous with or 
even sequent to the actual decision the bank to securitize. 
21 All variables were tested in the logistic regression at univariate level before joint test which is 
shown in appendix table 5 and significant variables are core deposits/total deposits, volatile 
deposits/deposits, loans/deposits, charge-off/loans, provision/loans, deposit interest expense/total 
deposits, ROA, and efficiency ratio. 
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Table 19: Logistic Regression Results of Different Variables Combinations 
Panel A (Excluding ROA) Scenario I. Scenario II. Scenario III. Scenario IV. 
Characteristics Constant -.052 -.104 -.073 -.272 
(.99) (.24) (.42) (.74) 
Liquidity Core deposits/total -.117 NA -.033 NA 
deposits (.31) (.22) 
Volatile deposits/total NA .017 NA .050 
deposits (.28) (.78) 
Loan/deposit .057 .077 .080 .067 
(.01)*** (.01)*** (.01)*** (.01)*** 
Portfolio Charge-of^loans 3.621 2.982 2.751 3.207 
quality (.44) (.06)* (.21) (.37) 
Funding cost Deposit interest 1.202 1.043 .975 1.044 
expense/Total Deposits (.02)** (.44) (.45) (.43) 
Profitability ROE .023 .069 .059 .085 
(.27) (.39) (.44) (.29) 
ROA -.140 -.082 NA NA 
(.43) (.31) 
Capital Tier I capital ratio NA NA -.074 -.067 
adequacy ratio (.29) (.48) 
Total capital ratio .069 .080 .010 052 
(.93) (.93) (.99) (.39) 
Efficiency Non-interest -.134 -.125 -.146 -.131 
expense/gross return (.01)*** (.04)** (.02)** (.03)**. 
Real estate loans/total .069 .080 .010 .052 
loans (.93) (.93) (.99) (.39) 
Portfolio Consumer & industrial .054 .017 .011 .043 
composition loans/total loans (.95) (.86) (.91) (.52) 
Retail loans/total loans .073 .030 .001 .031 
(.93) (.49) (.99) (.70) 
Test Power Percentage Correction % 78.3 51.7 75.0 23.0 
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Table 19: Logistic Regression Results of Different Variables Combinations 
Panel B (Including ROA) Scenario V Scenario VI 
Characteristics Constant -.205 -1.013 
(•46) (.72) 
Liquidity Core deposits/total -.043 NA 
deposits (.15) 
Volatile deposits/total NA .007 
deposits (.48) 
Loan/deposit .057 .039 
(.01)*** (.03)** 
Portfolio Charge-off/loans NA NA 
quality 
Funding cost Deposit interest 1.547 .884 
expense/Total Deposits (.17) (.23) 
Profitability ROA 2.623 3.220 
(.02)** (.01)*** 
ROE .360 .782 
(.46) (.68) 
Capital Tier I capital ratio NA NA 
adequacy ratio 
Total capital ratio NA NA 
Efficiency Non-interest -.122 -.213 
expense/gross return (.01)*** (.03.)** 
Real estate loans/total .037 .067 
loans (.39) (.77) 
Portfolio Consumer & industrial .014 .042 
composition loans/total loans (.81) (.46) 
Retail loans/total loans .058 .037 
(.41) (.56) 
Test Power Percentage Correction % 56.7% 73.5% 
As suggested by the correlation result, ROA highly correlates with charge-o历loans. Thus ROA was 
excluded when charge-off/loans was chosen in the test. Similarly, when ROA was included in the test, 
provision/loans would be excluded. 
Provision/loans, allowance/loan, net federal funds purchased/assets and reserves/loans were not 
chosen as they turned to be insignificant in the logistic test at univariate level. In addition, reserves/loans 
were found to highly correlate with capital adequacy ratios. 
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The logistic regression model is simply a non-linear transformation of the 
linear regression. The "logistic" distribution is an S-shaped distribution function 
which is similar to the standard-normal distribution. The logistic distribution 
constrains the estimated probabilities to lie between 0 and 1. 
The estimated coefficients must be interpreted with care. Instead of the slope 
coefficients (yS) being the rate of change in Y (the dependent variables) as X 
changes (as in linear regression), now the slope coefficient is interpreted as the rate 
of change in the "log odds" as X changes. This explanation is not very intuitive. It is 
possible to compute the more intuitive "marginal effect" of an independent variable 
on the probability. The marginal effect is 
dE(Y)/d 曰：UX)曰=P(Y=1) ( l -p(Y=l))3 
For the group of 20 securitizing matched with 40 non-securitizing by asset size, 
logistic regression is carried out. "0" is assigned to non-securitizing banks and "1" 
is assigned to securitizing banks as the volume is greater than zero. 
As discussed in section III, p(Y=l)= exp(召，X) / 1+ exp( ^ 'X), whereas /3 is 
vector the coefficients and x is vector of independent variables. Also, probability of 
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securitization "decision" changes as independent variables change. For example in 
combination I，we have Loans/Deposits (XI), Deposits Interest Expense/Total 
Deposits (X2) and efficiency ratio (X3) with significant coefficients. To calculate 
the marginal effect of those three factors, we should work out the probability to 
securitize i.e. p(Y=l) first. As different x values will influence the probability, I 
used mean value of each variable in the calculation. By setting every coefficient and 
each variable mean into the equation shown above, we can get the probability that 
the bank is securitizing and thus marginal effect of each variable. 
P(Y=1) = exp( yS 1X1+ ^ 2X2+ 3X3+ yS 4X4+... yS 10X10)/ 1+ exp(y31Xl+ 
yS 2X2+ yS 3X3+ P 4X4+... j3 10X10)，and 
Marginal effect of XI (Loans/Deposits) = p(Y=l) (l-p(Y=0)) 0 1 
Marginal effect of X2 (Deposits Interest Expense/Total Deposits)= p(Y=l) 
(l-p(Y=0))冷 2 
Marginal effect of X3 = p(Y=l) (l-p(Y=0)) /3 3 
When ROA is excluded, the best estimation among the four combinations is 
the first one with highest test power of 78.3%^^. The following table demonstrates 
The "Percent Correct Prediction" statistic assumes that if the estimated p is greater than or equal 
to .5 then the event is expected to occur and not occur otherwise. By assigning these probabilities Os 
and Is the Correct Prediction is constructed. The bigger the percentage of Correct Prediction is, the 
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how probability to securitize marginal effect is calculated given mean values of the 
independent variables for combination I. 
Table 20: Calculation for p(Y=l) and Marginal Effect of the Significant Variables in 
Scenario I 
X 0 P’X(sum exp(P’X) p(Y=l) Marginal 
(mean of P *X) (%) Effect 
value) (%) 
Loan/Deposit 88.49 .057 1.31 
Deposit 
Interest 
Expense/ 1.01 1.202 27.55 .59 1.81 64.42 
Total 
Deposits 
Efficiency 60.30 -.134 -3.07 Ratio 
Thus, probability to securitize is 64.42% for a bank of all variables values 
equal to the means of 20 securitizing and 40 non-securitizing banks. Also, the sign 
and magnitude of the coefficients show that probability to securitize is positively 
related to loan/deposit and deposit interest expense/total deposit but negatively 
related to efficiency ratio. 
The ratio of Loans/deposits recognizes a positive coefficient which describes 
that an increase in the ratio leads to higher chance to securitize. The marginal effect 
better the model. 
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shows that one percent increase in this ratio will lead to an increase of 1.31 percent 
in the possibility to securitize. As discussed above, the higher the ratio is the greater 
the liquidity risk will be. Thus this result confirms the hypothesis that a bank is 
more likely to be a securitizing bank when it faces higher liquidity needs. 
A positive coefficient for deposit interest expense/total deposit ratio means 
probability of securitization increases with higher funding cost. A one percent 
increase in this funding cost measure is correlated to 27.55 percent increase of the 
probability to securitize. As discussed in section III, banks prefer to securitize when 
they face higher funding cost. This positive relation between deposit interest 
expense/total deposit ratio and probability of securitization confirms this 
hypothesis. 
Efficiency ratio (non-interest expenses divided by total revenue) is negatively 
correlated with the securitization decision. This means that the more efficiently a 
bank operates, the higher the probability it will carry out securitization. A one 
percent increase in the efficiency ratio (i.e., the bank increasing its non-interest 
expense over revenue by 1%) will reduce the probability to securitize by 3.07%. 
This agrees with the expectation that "better-operated" banks are more capable and 
likely to securitize. 
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A significant positive coefficient is found for charge-off ratio in Scenario II. 
This positive sign means probability of securitization increases with higher 
charge-off on the loans. A higher ratio indicates poorer quality of the remaining 
assets on balance sheet. As discussed in section III，banks prefer to securitize their 
best assets and have its capital and deposits fund riskier assets. Obay also argues 
that in order to get a triple A rating on the repackaged loans, banks have an 
incentive to sell only their best assets, thereby leaving the FDIC insuring a riskier 
asset structure. The positive relation between charge-off ratio and probability of 
securitization confirms this hypothesis. 
From the second part of the logistic test where ROA is included, Scenario VI 
has higher test power and the test result is shown below. 
Table 21: Calculation for p(Y=l) and Marginal Effect of the Significant Variables in 
Scenario VI 
X 3 P 'X(sum eA(P，X) p(Y=l) Marginal 
(mean ofP *X) (%) Effect 
value) (%) 
Loans/deposits 88.49 .039 .86 
ROA 1.24 3.220 70.87 .72 2.06 67.29 Efficiency 60.30 -.213 -4.69 ratio 
Given mean values of the three ratios, probability to securitize is 67.29%. The 
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decision is positive relation with loans/deposits, ROA and negative relation with 
efficiency ratio. 
Again, loan/deposits ratio and efficiency ratio have similar marginal effect on 
the decision to securitize as previous test result. 
ROA seems to be another important factor related to the decision whether or 
not to securitize here. A one percent increase will lead to 70.87% increase in the 
possibility to securitize. This result supports the hypothesis that banks with higher 
profit or better performance are more likely to securitize. 
In summary, the test results show that the probability that a bank is securitizing 
is positively correlated to liquidity risk, funding cost and profitability, but 
negatively related to the efficiency ratio and loan quality. 
D. Linear Regression to Explain the Degree of Securitizing Among Securitizing 
Banks 
As discussed in Section III，the 53 securitizing banks are selected as sample 
group in the joint test of linear regression to determine the reasons for the degree of 





regression test, the log of total assets is applied as measurement of size in the linear 
regression test of degree of securitization. 
• i 
i t i 
Securitization volume as percentage of total assets is chosen to be dependent 
I 
i 
variable in linear regression test. The minimum is .1% while the maximum is 199%. 
The mean is 16.85 and the median is 4.57%. Table A6 in appendix shows us 
summary statistics on all variables. 
Similar tests with charge-ofif/loans replaced by provision/loans or 
allowance/loans are carried out, both of the other two variables turn out to be 
insignificant. Furthermore, the test power is highest for the regressions with 
charge-off71oans presented above. 
Though multicolinearity problem has been solved to certain extent, the 
non-normal distribution of the error terms limits the use of the findings to draw 
inferences about the underlying population. As shown by the summary statistics in 
appendix Table A6, the 53 banks in the study do not represent a random sample of 
the over two thousands BHCs. They, however, constitute an important mass in the 
banking industry. They control around 40% of all BHCs assets in the US. 
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Table 22: Linear Regression Test Result on Joint Effects of Variables 
Combination Combination Combination Combination 
I. II. III. IV. 
Characteristics Constant -287.573 -239.075 -281.498 -232.603 
(.01)*** (.02)** (.01)*** (.01)*** 
Liquidity Core Deposits/Total -.240 NA -.033 NA 
Deposits (.31) (.22) 
Volatile Deposits/Total NA .019 NA .018 
Deposits (.52) (.55) 
Loan/Deposit .030 .001 .006 .003 
(.14) (.96) (.34) (.93) 
Net Fed Funds -1.46 -2.17 -1.57 -1.74 
Purchased/Assets (.34) (.22) (.67) (.52) 
Portfolio Charge-off/Loans 11.192 10.775 11.145 10.68 
quality (.01)*** (.06)* (.01)*** (.01)*** 
Funding cost Deposit Interest 5.913 5.463 5.954 5.501 
Expense/Total Deposits (.01)*** (.01)*** (.01)*** (.01)*** 
Profitability ROA NA NA NA NA 
ROE 4.519 4.227 .4.515 4.220 
(.01)*** (.01)*** (.01)*** (.01)*** 
Capital Tier I Capital Ratio -.566 -.497 NA NA 
adequacy ratio (.24) (.31) 
Total Capital Ratio NA NA -.525 -.444 
(.29) (.38) 
Efficiency Non Interest -.620 -.633 -.621 -.628 
Expense/Gross Return (.23) (.24) (.23) (.24) 
Real estate loans/total -316 -255 .296 -233 
loans (.36) (.45) (.39) (.49) 
Portfolio Consumer & Industrial .199 .215 .265 .238 
composition Loans/Total Loans (.74) (.73) (.71) (.79) 
Retail Loans/Total Loans .113 .144 .013 .104 
(.77) (.75) (.81) (.70) 
Size Ln (Total Assets) 7.347 6.392 7.062 6.108 
(.42) (.88) (.32) (.64) 
Test Power R Square 59.51 38.50 22.84 48.11 
As ROA has correlations with other variables, such as capital adequacy ratios and portfolio quality 
ratios and ROE turned to be significant in the joint test, ROA has been dropped in this test. 
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From the regression results, we can conclude that, portfolio quality (charge-off 
/ loans), funding cost (deposit interest expense/total deposits), and profitability 
(ROE) have significant relation with securitization volume as percentage of total 
assets. 
The findings are consistent with Wilcoxon test. However, variables that are 
found to be significantly linked to the securitization decision are not necessarily the 
ones that exert a significant weight in determining the amount of assets to be 
securitized. Liquidity risk and efficiency ratio don't have a significant relation with 
the level of securitization as they do on the decision to securitize. 
Regulatory capital ratios turn out to be insignificant. This thesis hypothesizes 
lower capital adequacy ratio leads to higher degree of securitization based on the 
discussion of regulatory capital arbitrage and capital saving. However, it's found 
that banks were well above the minimum capital requirement of 8 percent. The 
average ratio of total capital and Tier I capital were 17.14 and 18.70 percent for 20 
securitizing banks and 12.44 and 14.28 percent for non-securitizing banks by the 
end of year 2004. This may explain that why capital adequacy ratios don't promote 
higher securitization degree. 
！ 
I i I 
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Portfolio composition measures are again insignificant in the linear test. As the 
dependent variable is set to be degree of all-type securitization as a sum, the relation 
between all types securitization volume and each type of loan's weight may be 
ambiguous. 
Now let's have a close up at test result of "combination I" which gains highest 
test power. Holding other factors constant, a one percent increase in the ratio of 
Charge-ofE/Loans leaded to 11.192 percent of increase in securitization volume as 
percentage to total assets. This shows that higher credit risk of portfolio motivates 
the bank to securitize more as suggested in the hypothesis. Higher charge-off to 
loans ratio means poorer quality of the portfolio. The better the quality of 
repackaged assets are, the lesser the enhancement that is needed to realize an 
improved return and the better the acceptance of the issue among investors. 
Therefore, higher charge-off ratio representing lower quality of the remaining assets 
on balance sheet is likely to be associated with higher securitization volume. 
The test result also shows that a one percent increase in ROE brings 4.519 
percent increase in securitization degree. ROE has a significantly positive 
coefficient indicating that better performance or profit of the bank is associated with 
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more securitization. Obay gets the same result. It shows more profitable banks 
could be more capable to involve more in securitization. However, there is a strong 
possibility that causation flows in the other direction. Securitization can lead to 
recognition of portfolio volume through booking the excess spread on asset side. 
With my test, I cannot determine whether securitization brings profits to the bank or 
whether profitable banks securitize. 
Funding costs are insignificant in relation with the decision whether or not to 
securitize yet they present a positive relation with securitization degree. A one 
percent increase in the ratio of Deposit Interest Expense/Total Deposits is linked to 
5.913 percent increase in securitization volume. This follows the discussion that 
banks with higher funding costs seek to securitize as an alternative funding 
mechanism. As discussed in Section III，banks that lack of funds are likely to resort 
to intermediated funding which costs more than retail funding. These banks are 
encouraged to use securitization as another funding channel. 
Another finding is that the size factor has insignificant relation with dependant 
variable, whereas Obay finds out that the asset size is positively correlated with 
securitization degree. This may due to high concentration of large banks in my 
sample group. As the 53 banks being tested are mainly largest in term of assets size, 
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the size factor among the large banks may have no significance. The fact that 75% 
of the securitizing banks are from the top 100 banks already proves size is crucial 
factor in securitization decision but not that important for securitization degree 
within these large banks. 
In summary, degree of securitization increases with higher funding cost, credit 
risk of the loan portfolio and profitability. Liquidity risk, capital adequacy ratio 
efficiency, portfolio composition and size are found insignificant to have correlation 
with how much to securitize. 
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V. Conclusion and Insights for Future Research 
A. Conclusion 
Securitization activities are concentrated among top banks ranked by asset size. The 
assets most securitized are mortgage loan and credit card receivables. 
Test findings have answered the three questions raised at the beginning of the paper 
1. Do characteristics differ between securitizing and non-securitizing groups? 
Yes, Securitizing and non-securitizing banks are statistically different at an 
overall level described by variables indicating characteristics of liquidity, portfolio 
quality, funding cost, capital adequacy, profitability and portfolio composition. At 
univariate level, securitizing and non-securitizing banks differ based on liquidity 
risk, portfolio quality, funding cost, profitability, and capital adequacy ratio. After 
controlling for the size factor, securitizing banks have higher liquidity needs (core 
deposit/total deposits; volatile deposit/total deposits; net fed funds purchased/assets), 
poorer portfolio quality (charge-off/ loans), higher profit and better performance 
(ROA), higher funding cost (deposit interest expense/total deposits), and lower 
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capital adequacy ratios (tier I and total risk-based capital ratio). All results agreed 
with what were expected by the theories of information asymmetry, regulatory 
arbitrage and bankruptcy cost avoidance. Obay (2000) only finds that capital 
adequacy ratio, liquidity needs and securitizable loan ratio are significantly different 
between the two groups. This thesis confirms his findings and further develops 
more robust results in portfolio quality, bank performance and profitability. I do the 
test based on size-matching sample groups in order to eliminate size effect on the 
variables which may cause the difference between my result and Obay's. As data in 
the sample does not follow normal distribution, Obay's comparison between means 
of the securitizing and non-securitizing banks may be problematic. Instead, I use the 
Wilcoxon test to compare the medians of the variables to get rid of the normal 
distribution constraint. 
2. How do characteristics jointly related to the decision to securitize? 
This thesis sheds light upon motives of securitization decision. All logistic tests 
show that higher liquidity needs (loans over deposits) combined with higher 
profitability (ROA) and lower efficiency ratio (i.e., higher efficiency) are linked to 
higher probability to adopt securitization activities. Also, some test also shows 
higher funding costs (deposit interest expense over total deposits) or poorer quality 
of the loan portfolio (charge-off/loans) has significant correlation with the use of 
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securitization. 
Positive sign on the loan/deposits ratio is accordance with the hypothesis that 
higher liquidity needs are the motivates banks to securitize. 
The positive relation between funding cost and securitization decision supports 
the discussion of funding cost saving in Section III. The result also follows the 
theory of information asymmetry resolving that securitizing funding cost is lower 
compared to deposit funding. 
Defined as non-interest expense over gross revenue, the efficiency ratio 
measures the general well-being of operations. Its purpose is to evaluate the 
overhead structure of a financial institution. A lower ratio indicates lower cost and 
higher efficiency. Financial institutions with greater efficiency are more likely to be 
securitizing. 
Charge-off/loans has a significantly positive sign. This result follows the 
intuition of incentive to securitize banks' best assets and hold riskier assets on their 
balance sheets since the return on these assets is generally higher than that of 
high-quality lower-risk assets. Obay also argues that in order to get a triple A rating 
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on the repackaged loans, banks have an incentive to sell only their best assets, 
thereby leaving the FDIC insuring a riskier asset structure. 
ROA not only represents profitability but also a bank performance. The 
positive relation follows the intuition that securitization requires the bank to be 
sophisticated with good performance. From the other hand, ROA could be 
substantially augmented by removing the securitized assets from their books and 
generating profits with the proceeds. 
3. Is there a linear relationship between degree of securitization and the 
characteristics? 
Yes, the linear test of the degree of securitization is not as robust as the 
Wilcoxon or logistic test. Nevertheless, profitability, funding cost and portfolio 
quality are jointly correlated with securitization volume. Higher funding cost and 
ROE, are associated with higher degree of securitization, which agrees with the 
Obay's finding. Whereas the positive relation between securitization degree and 
charge-off over loans is contrary to Obay's finding. As suggested by information 
asymmetry and regulatory arbitrage theories, banks benefit from securitizing their 
best assets and keeping the risky assets on the balance sheet. Following this 
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intuition, a higher charge-off ratio is more likely to be found in securitizing banks 
as the remaining assets are of poor quality. Therefore, the test result in the paper 
agrees with the theories I reviewed. 
From this thesis, bankers could leam that liquidity needs, funding cost, 
profitability and efficiency ratio are significantly correlated with securitization. 
Thus, when they face increase of loans over deposits ratio, charge-off over loans or 
decrease of efficiency ratio, securitization would be considered especially the bank 
is large enough to bear the fixed cost. 
Also, regulators could gain a close-up on the significant motives for 
securitization and this will facilitate monitoring of securitizing banks. 
Basel II aims to combat regulatory arbitrage that could be easily achieved 
under Basel I. Regulators are putting on more emphases on operational and capital 
requirements on securitization as Basel II includes a whole section about treatments 
of securitization. The new accord treats exposures very unequally based on 
exposure characteristics and it treats banks unequally depending on sophistication 
of risk management systems. A better understanding of how liquidity or efficiency 
ratio are related to the securitization decision and degree will aid regulators to 
assess securitizing bank's report on risk exposure and operating performances. 
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In summary, the test results corresponding to the three questions support the 
argument of saving regulatory capital, increasing liquidity risk, lower funding cost 
and resolving information asymmetry. Lower capital adequacy ratios for 
securitizing banks support the capital arbitrage theory. However, the ratio turns to 
be insignificant on decision of securitization and needs further investigation. 
B. Future Research 
I apply weights of different loans as measurement of portfolio composition, but 
hardly find any relation with securitization volume in linear regression and 
securitization decision logistic regression. As portfolio composition could be 
presented by other measures, further tests may be carried out to further examine the 
relation between portfolio composition and securitization. 
A major shortcoming of this thesis is that data in all tests are carried from the 
same time period giving rise to confusion between cause and effect. For example, 
a bank with higher funding cost ratio in previous period may decide to securitize 
more in next period. If in the next period, securitization is carried out, it will release 
the bank's debt constraint. This relation would be reflected with funding cost 
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figures in current period and securitization decision for next period. Thus, similar 
tests should be done on a time series basis. 
Tests carried out in this thesis reveal certain correlations between securitization 
decision/degree and bank characteristics from the angle of motives for 
securitization. The effect that securitization plays on bank's ratios could be further 
tested in separate tests. For example, higher profitability is found to be correlated 
with higher securitizing volume. However, the direction of cause and effect has not 
been worked out yet. In other words, how to measure the impact of securitization on 
banks' profitability remains as question for further research. 
This thesis uses three default risk measures, i.e. charge-off/loans, 
provision/loans and allowance/loans as indicators of loan quality on the balance 
sheet. However, those ratios could not exactly convey that how "bad" was the asset 
quality as implied by information asymmetry theory. Level of information 
asymmetry depends on how hard it is to predict the default risk of the assets rather 
than the absolute value of default risk. For example, credit card loans have high 
default risk but are preferred to be securitized as one major ABS. 
Those aspects of future research addressed above will further discover the 
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mutual impacts between bank characteristics and their securitization activities. 
More accurate measures on the characteristics and a time series method will bring 
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Appendix 
Table Al : Variables Selected from the Bank Holding Company Performance Report 
Liquidity Risk 
Term Core deposit/ Volatile Reserves/ Net Federal Loans/ 
Loans Deposits/ Deposits Funds Deposits 
Deposits Purchased/ 
Assets 
Data Schedule Schedule Schedule HC Schedule HC HC item 13 a 
HC-E of 1. HC-E item 1-3 / HC item 14b - 14a and b / HC-C 
a-d and 2. a-d. Memoranda item 13 a and / HC item 12 item 12 
/ Schedule item 1, 2，and b 
HC-C item 12 4, HC-E le, 
2e, HC item 
14 / HC item 
13 a andb 
Portfolio Quality 
Term Charge-off/Loans Allowances/Loans Provision/Loans 
Data Schedule HI-B item 9 Schedule HC item 4c/ Schedule HI item 4 / 
column A / HC-C HC-C item 12 HC-C item 12 
item 12 
Funding Cost 
Term Deposit Interest Expense /Total Deposits 
Data Schedule HI item 2 a and b / HC item 13 a 
and b 
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Regulatory Adequacy Ratio 
Term Total Risked-based Capital Tier I Risk-based Capital Ratio ( 
Ratio 
Data Schedule HC-R item 33 Schedule HC-R item 32 
Profitability and Efficiency Ratio 
Term Return on Asset Return on Equity Non-Interest Expense 
(Net income I Net (Net income / Total /Gross Revenue 
Total Assets) Equity) (non-interest income 
+ interest income) 
Data Schedule HI item 13/ Schedule HI item 13/ Schedule HI item 2 a 
Schedule HC item 12 Schedule HI item 28 and b / HI item 1 a 
Portfolio Composition 
Term Real Estate Consumer & Retail Loans/ Total 
Loans/Total Loans Industrial Loans/ Loans 
Total Loams 
Data Schedule HC-C item Schedule HC-C item Schedule HC-C item 
11 Schedule HC-C 41 Schedule HC-C 6 / Schedule HC-c 
item 12 item 12 item 12 
Size 
Term Log (Net Total Assets) 
Data Log (Schedule HC item 12) 
94 
Table A2: Listing of Banks in the Study: 53 Securitizing Banks 
Name Assets ($mn) Securitization % of 
volume ($mn) Assets 
J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO. 1,138,469.00 95,842.00 8.42 
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION 1,089,312.37 86,754.23 7.96 
CITICORP 899,597.00 339,609.00 37.75 
WACHOVIA CORPORATION 436,698.00 61,141.00 14.00 
WELLS FARGO & COMPANY 421,549.00 202,483.00 48.03 
TAUNUS CORPORATION 321,376.00 27,029.00 8.41 
U.S. BANCORP 192,844.00 396.00 0.21 
HSBC NORTH AMERICA INC. 155,257.98 4,739.21 3.05 
NATIONAL CITY CORPORATION 136,372.58 3,376.00 2.48 
SUNTRUST BANKS, INC. 127,785.99 57,445.72 44.95 
COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORPORATION 104,388.45 207,974.31 199.23 
STATE STREET CORPORATION 100,526.52 1,634.51 1.63 
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 98,293.07 1,497.77 1.52 
BANK OF NEW YORK COMPANY, INC., THE 93,692.29 92.00 0.10 
KEYCORP 88,086.35 5,125.03 5.82 
REGIONS FINANCIAL CORPORATION 83,630.86 1,965.89 2.35 
PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC., THE 77,310.14 2,843.01 3.68 
MBNA CORPORATION 62,051.86 85,672.35 138.07 
SOUTHTRUST CORPORATION 53,888.17 550.73 1.02 
M&T BANK CORPORATION 52,886.90 8,195.86 15.50 
CHARLES SCHWAB CORPORATION, THE 45,934.70 290.10 0.63 
POPULAR, INC. 42,856.00 4,297.00 10.03 
BANCWEST CORPORATION 41,413.14 105.26 0.25 
MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORPORATION 39,006.41 899.09 2.30 
CIBC DELAWARE HOLDINGS INC. 37,427.65 1,203.00 3.21 
MELLON FINANCIAL CORPORATION 35,238.85 3,351.85 9.51 
HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INCORPORATED 31,807.49 197.48 0.62 
ZIONS BANCORPORATION 30,731.04 447.36 1.46 
COMMERCE BANCORP, INC. 28,443.36 35.63 0.13 
FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORPORATION 28,296.53 8,610.05 30.43 
COMPASS BANCSHARES, INC. 27,850.31 1,637.27 5.88 
GREENPOINT FINANCIAL CORP. 26,961.95 3,524.35 13.07 
NATIONAL COMMERCE 24,211.36 302.32 1.25 
FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
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HIBERNIA CORPORATION 21,353.37 78.41 0.37 
DORAL FINANCIAL CORPORATION 14,983.40 10,715.61 71.52 
MERCANTILE BANKSHARES CORPORATION 14,303.02 125.95 0.88 
SOUTH FINANCIAL GROUP, THE 13,649.52 20.68 0.15 
FIRST NATIONAL OF NEBRASKA, INC. 12,074.86 2,577.33 21.34 
INTERNATIONAL BANCSHARES CORPORATION 9,440.64 30.97 0.33 
R&G FINANCIAL CORPORATION 9,188.85 3,932.31 42.79 
FRANKLIN RESOURCES, INC. 8,220.02 791.24 9.63 
FIRST BANKS, INC. 7,566.41 23.15 0.31 
SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES, INC. 7,449.86 516.22 6.93 
UNITED BANKSHARES, INC. 6,289.65 28.20 0.45 
EAST WEST BANCORP, INC. 5,567.84 65.51 1.18 
IRWIN FINANCIAL CORPORATION 5,388.75 591.75 10.98 
MB FINANCIAL, INC 5,069.41 8.50 0.17 
AMCORE FINANCIAL, INC. 4,878.73 135.27 2.77 
MAINSOURCE FINANCIAL GROUP 1,556.71 500.59 32.16 
FARMERS & MERCHANTS INVESTMENT，INC. 1,404.49 274.16 19.52 
AMERICAN NATIONAL CORPORATION 1,370.23 63.78 4.65 
LAURITZEN CORPORATION 1,166.10 462.04 39.62 
UNITED NATIONAL CORPORATION 1,043.42 47.71 4.57 
Three Observations Excluded as Extreme Values 
ASSOCIATED BANC-CORP 16,175.65 0.40 0.00 
W HOLDING COMPANY, INC. 13,478.86 0.54 0.00 
VIRGINIA COMMERCE BANCORP, INC. 1,106.54 0.32 0.03 
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Table A3: Listing of Banks in the Study: 53 Non-securitizing Banks 
Name Assets ($mn) 
CITIZENS FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. 134,436.10 
ABN AMRO NORTH AMERICA HOLDING COMPANY 134,073.16 
BB&T CORPORATION 97,880.40 
COMERICA INCORPORATED 53,273.02 
AMSOUTH BANCORPORATION 49,892.47 
UNIONB ANCAL CORPORATION 47,041.20 
NORTHERN TRUST CORPORATION 41,110.02 
HARRIS FINANCIAL CORP. 39,939.16 
BANKNORTH GROUP, INC. 29,003.19 
NORTH FORK BANCORPORATION, INC. 27,502.81 
UTRECHT-AMERICA HOLDINGS, INC. 25,903.72 
SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP. 24,395.88 
NEW YORK COMMUNITY BANCORP, INC. 23,671.32 
RBC CENTURA BANKS, INC. 19,975.47 
TD WATERHOUSE GROUP, INC. 19,602.53 
COLONIAL BANCGROUP, INC, THE 18,227.24 
WEBSTER FINANCIAL CORPORATION 17,810.52 
SKY FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. 14,665 • 16 
BOK FINANCIAL CORPORATION 14,435.56 
COMMERCE BANCSHARES，INC. 14,153.30 
CITY NATIONAL CORPORATION 13,982.61 
CBI-KANSAS, INC. 13,829.53 
FIRST CITIZENS BANCSHARES, INC. 13,019.10 
FBOP CORPORATION 12,912.59 
TCF FINANCIAL CORPORATION 12’ 114.08 
INVESTORS FINANCIAL SERVICES CORP. 10,793.39 
VALLEY NATIONAL BANCORP 10,630.85 
BANCORPSOUTH, INC. 10,613.13 
FULTON FINANCIAL CORPORATION 10,568.82 
PEOPLE'S MUTUAL HOLDINGS 10,564.71 
FIRSTMERIT CORPORATION 10,164.48 
CULLEN/FROST BANKERS, INC. 9,898.80 
WILMINGTON TRUST CORPORATION 9,667.50 
ESB ACQUISITION CORP. 9,634.62 
BANK OF HAWAII CORPORATION 9,602.51 
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OLD NATIONAL BANCORP 8,982.40 
HUDSON UNITED BANCORP 8,833.76 
DISCOUNT BANCORP, INC. 8,600.03 
TRUSTMARK CORPORATION 8，150.63 
WHITNEY HOLDING CORPORATION 8,075.77 
SANTANDER BANCORP 7,965.83 
CITIZENS BANKING CORPORATION 7,658.68 
FIRSTBANK HOLDING COMPANY 7,274.52 
GREATER BAY BANCORP 7,126.50 
ARVEST BANK GROUP, INC. 7,024.17 
FIRST MIDWEST BANCORP, INC. 6,934.57 
UMB FINANCIAL CORPORATION 6,872.26 
SOUTHWEST BANCORPORATION OF TEXAS, INC. 6,633.48 
PROVIDENT FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. 6,541.45 
CENTRAL BANCOMPANY 6,527.14 
PROVIDENT BANKSHARES CORPORATION 6,397.84 
NEWALLIANCE BANCSHARES, INC. 6,283.30 
FIRST COMMONWEALTH FINANCIAL 6,258.71 
CORPORATION 
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Table A4: Logistic Test on Single Variables 
Variables/Scenarios On single variable Coefficient and 
significance 
Core Deposit/Total Deposits Significant -.027 
(.084)* 
Volatile Deposit/Total Deposits Significant .033 
(.072)* 
Reserves/Deposits Insignificant .003 
(•332) 
Loan/Deposits Significant .059 
( .004)… 
Net Fed Funds Purchased/Assets Insignificant -.092 
(.253) 
Deposit Interest Expense/Total Deposits Significant 2.01 
(.023)** 
ROE Insignificant .014 
(.51) 
ROA Significant 1.933 
(.035)** 
Charge-off/loans Significant 1.990 
(.045)** 
Provision/loans Significant 3.880 
(.089)* 
Allowance/loans Insignificant .128 
(.409) 
Tier I Capital Ratio Insignificant .047 
(.167) 
Total Capital Ratio Insignificant .046 
(.180) 
Efficiency ratio Significant -.093 
(.004)*** 
Real Estate Loans/Total Loans Insignificant 1.305 
(.497) 
Consumer & Industrial Loans/Total Loans Insignificant .252 
(.942) 
Retail Loans/Total Loans Insignificant 1.345 
(.486) 
99 
Table A5: Summary Statistics on Independent Variables and Dependent Variable for 
53 securitizing banks 
Standard Standard 
Mean Error Median Deviation Kurtosis Skewness Minimum Maximum 
Core deposits/total 
deposits % 73.62 3.00 81.49 22.45 3.31 -1.88 2.43 99.69 
Net federal fund 
purchased/assets % 1.38 .42 .65 3.16 6.78 2.18 -2.90 15.49 
Loan/deposit % 94.69 3.35 98.19 23.49 3.91 -1.55 9.51 140.20 
Volatile 
deposits/total 
deposits % 31.96 2.41 27.90 16.92 3.14 1.54 7.99 91.10 
Reserves /deposits 
% 66.09 46.52 38.92 348.16 24.88 4.91 8.98 143 
Charge-off/loans 
% .40 0.07 0.25 .20 5.37 4.01 0.00 3.48 
Provisions/loans % .28 .06 .19 .45 18.67 3.25 0 2.77 
Allowance/loans 
% 1.29 .07 1.28 .54 20.19 1.16 .18 3.55 
Deposit interest 
expense/total 
deposits�/� 55.35 2.62 56.17 19.63 1.25 -.80 1.03 93.07 
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Table A5: Summary Statistics on Independent Variables and Dependent Variable for 
53 Securitizing Banks 
Continued 
Standard Standard 
Mean Error Median Deviation Kurtosis Skewness Minimum Maximum 
Tier I risk based 
capital % 12.71 1.54 9.59 11.57 19.24 4.06 -4.65 76.27 
Total risk based 
capital % 15.07 1.51 12.16 11.30 18.61 3.95 -4.65 76.36 
ROA % 1.36 .23 .97 1.77 29.41 5.16 .14 12.66 
ROE % 13.42 1.59 57.33 11.58 .25 3.47 7.52 84.43 
Efficiency ratio % 58.50 1.61 57.04 12.07 0.22 -.05 26.50 84.43 
Real estate 
loans/loans % 56.70 3.05 58.24 22.17 0.33 -.50 0.00 99.12 
Consumer & 
industrial 
loans/loans % 16.55 1.12 17.03 8.17 -.05 -.24 0.00 33.84 
Retail loans/loans 
% 13.53 2.23 9.56 16.27 10.40 2.90 0.00 88.26 
Size 17.16 .23 17.20 1.73 -.21 .03 13.85 20.85 
Securitization 
degree % 16.85 4.75 4.57 34.59 16.96 3.86 0.10 199.23 
* 
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